Back in December I reported that the ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services had issued its final Resolution and Report on Regulatory Objectives and that I found it essentially bland and neither innovative nor controversial.
Yet, something happened between then and now, and two days ago the ABA House of Delegates adopted a revised and
amended version of the Regulatory Objectives Resolution which is more interesting. You can find
it here.
But first a bit of background. As I have said many times recently, the big buzzword in Professional Responsibility these days is "innovation." Although the word has been used to refer to many different things, they all have in common the notion that we should be open to the idea of fundamentally changing the way we think about the legal services marketplace. This also ties in with the idea that we should think of how to change the existing regulatory schemes to allow for the innovation in the marketplace of legal services.
Some of this type of thinking has been traced back to the events that resulted in the adoption of the 2007 Legal Services Act, which fundamentally changed the legal marketplace in the UK. Since then, many in the US have been discussing whether it would be a good idea to follow their example. And one big first step in that direction is to reflect on why it is that we regulate, how we regulate and whether our regulatory system works well to uphold the goals we meant to achieve by enacting the regulation in the first place.
It is never a bad thing to reflect on how we do our jobs and on ways we could do it better etc. I do it all the time as it relates to my teaching. But, obviously, there is more to it that that at issue here.
The underlying issue is the question of whether it would be a good idea to open the legal services market to non-lawyers, to change the rules that ban non-lawyers from owning law firms or sharing fees with non-lawyers, among other things. In other words, all the types of things we usually refer to under the umbrella of "innovation."
We know some states are already moving in that direction by allowing non lawyers to provide limited legal services; we know non lawyers want states to open the legal services market so they can share in the profits, etc.
Yet, it wasn't clear whether the ABA would welcome this type of change. And, interestingly, the resolution approved last Monday does not provide a clear answer.
In one paragraph it states that "the American Bar Association urges that [all jurisdictions] be guided by the ABA Model Regulatory Objectives for the Provision of Legal Services when they assess the ... existing regulatory framework and any other regulations they may choose to develop concerning non-traditional legal service providers."
But in the next paragraph, the Resolution makes clear that it does not endorse that much innovation by stating that "nothing contained in this Resolution abrogates in any manner existing ABA policy prohibiting non lawyer ownership of law firms or the core values adopted by the House of Delegates."
So, if the idea was to open the door to the type of innovation that resulted in fundamental changes in the UK, the exercise failed.
On the other hand, if it was just an exercise in reiterating the core values of the profession and the public policies upon which its regulation are based, then the Resolution is useful.
It seems the ABA is accepting the fact that some innovative change is coming (in fact, some of it is already in place), but it is urging that this change be regulated and that it be regulated according to the traditional principles upon which we have always based the regulation of the profession.
The irony is that some of those principles are, precisely, what may prevent the most innovative ideas from getting implemented. ... So, the debate continues.
For more on the adoption of the resolution go to the Legal Ethics Forum, Lawyer's Ethics Alert Blog, Professional Responsibility, A Contemporary Approach, Lawyerist.
For a critical view of the notion of innovation in general and the ABA's approach in particular go to Simple Justice.
Wednesday, February 10, 2016
D.C. District Court Proposes New Rules on Prosecutors Disclosure Obligations
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has released a proposed rule which would codify the government’s discovery obligation set out by the Supreme Court. Most significantly, it imposes specific timelines on prosecutors. The Legal Profession Blog has more details (and the text of the proposed rule) here.
Avvo expands its Legal Services program to 18 states; Should attorneys be concerned? (part 2)
A few days ago, I posted a long comment expressing my concern over the new Avvo Legal Services, which it describes as an online legal
services marketplace now offering fixed-fee, limited-scope legal
services through a network of attorneys. Many others have raised similar concerns. See, among many others, Solo Practice University; Simple Justice and the comments to stories in the ABA Journal.com here, here and here.
Coincidentally, yesterday Avvo announced it has now expanded the service to 18 states, covering about 70 percent of the US population. I first read the story in Law Sites, which describes the news and the service and quotes Avvo's general counsel and CEO. I left a comment expressing my opinion about one of their claims and asking for an explanation, and the General Counsel for Avvo was kind enough to reply. You can read our exchange in the comments below the story here and judge for yourself as to whether Avvo's explanation makes sense to you.
I find it interesting that when challenged on whether lawyers paying for the service could be found to be in violation of the rule against sharing fees with non-lawyers, Avvo's GC claimed the rule is unconstitutional as applied under the First Amendment. (Is Avvo arguing that because it calls the fee a "marketing fee," paying the fee makes it advertising? I don't know.) This means that in the last couple of days I have read of Avvo claiming that the transaction is not fee sharing because it is a separate transaction, that the transaction is not fee sharing because it is paying for advertising, that if the transaction is fee sharing, it is allowed by the rules, and that if it is not allowed by the rule, the rule in unconstitutional.
Also, I don't understand why Avvo doesn't instead argue that it is covered by comment [5] to Rule 7.2 which says that "a lawyer may pay others for generating client leads, such as Internet-based client leads, as long as the lead generator does not recommend the lawyer, any payment to the lead generator is consistent with Rules 1.5(e) (division of fees) and 5.4 (professional independence of the lawyer), and the lead generator’s communications are consistent with Rule 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer’s services)."
This is an interesting relatively new comment that I have not seen interpreted in any cases. (If you know of one, please send it my way - I'd like to see it.) My sense is that this comment was adopted precisely to be more lenient with respect to the ban to pay others for referring clients, by opening the door to online services that connect clients with lawyers -- which is precisely what Avvo does. The problem is that there are a few things in the comment that have not been tested (at least to my knowledge). What is a "client lead"? Does that refer to information or to an actual client? If the intent is to allow payment for information but not for an actual client, then the comment won't help Avvo. Again, I have not done the research to know how "leads" has been interpreted (or is meant to be interpreted).
Also, and more importantly, what does it mean when it says that the payment won't violate Rule 7.2 as long as it is "consistent with" Rules 1.5 and 5.4. Is "consistent with" the same as "complies with" or is there a difference? If it means that in order for the payment not to violate 7.2 the lawyer also has to comply with 1.5(e) and 5.4, that means that payment to a non-lawyer will be in violation of 7.2 because sharing a fee with a non lawyer is by definition a violation of 5.4 and irrelevant to 1.5(e) which is about sharing fees with other lawyers. Since internet "lead generators" are not likely to be lawyers, I think that "consistent with" means something other than "complies with."
Viewed that way, the question becomes whether allowing payment to a non-lawyer for finding and sending a client to the lawyer threatens the policies and concerns for which we decided to adopt the requirements in 1.5(e) and the ban in 5.4. And I think Avvo can make a case that allowing this type of payment does not. I don't know how convincing the argument will be before the authorities, but you can make the argument. Which is why I don't understand why not go for this argument rather than the strange argument based on the First Amendment (which appears to be based on a forced interpretation of what the speech in question is and an incorrect reading of the constitutional standard that applies (note that Avvo's GC argues the state has to show harm, an argument the Supreme Court dismissed in Ohralik).
Having said all that, it seems Avvo is here to stay and that at least for now states are tolerating it. However, it will be interesting to see what happens in the near future. It will be interesting to see if attorneys ask their local Ethics Commissions to issue opinions on whether sharing fees with Avvo is ethical. Hopefully some will and we will begin to see the responses in different states.
It will also be interesting to see if states will then create regulations to apply to the non lawyers in the legal marketplace. The ABA just adopted a resolution urging jurisdictions to regulate the non lawyers in the legal services marketplace according to the policies and values of the legal profession. Ironically, this may lead to a finding that it is not a good idea to abandon the ban related to sharing fees with a non-lawyer.
Coincidentally, yesterday Avvo announced it has now expanded the service to 18 states, covering about 70 percent of the US population. I first read the story in Law Sites, which describes the news and the service and quotes Avvo's general counsel and CEO. I left a comment expressing my opinion about one of their claims and asking for an explanation, and the General Counsel for Avvo was kind enough to reply. You can read our exchange in the comments below the story here and judge for yourself as to whether Avvo's explanation makes sense to you.
I find it interesting that when challenged on whether lawyers paying for the service could be found to be in violation of the rule against sharing fees with non-lawyers, Avvo's GC claimed the rule is unconstitutional as applied under the First Amendment. (Is Avvo arguing that because it calls the fee a "marketing fee," paying the fee makes it advertising? I don't know.) This means that in the last couple of days I have read of Avvo claiming that the transaction is not fee sharing because it is a separate transaction, that the transaction is not fee sharing because it is paying for advertising, that if the transaction is fee sharing, it is allowed by the rules, and that if it is not allowed by the rule, the rule in unconstitutional.
Also, I don't understand why Avvo doesn't instead argue that it is covered by comment [5] to Rule 7.2 which says that "a lawyer may pay others for generating client leads, such as Internet-based client leads, as long as the lead generator does not recommend the lawyer, any payment to the lead generator is consistent with Rules 1.5(e) (division of fees) and 5.4 (professional independence of the lawyer), and the lead generator’s communications are consistent with Rule 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer’s services)."
This is an interesting relatively new comment that I have not seen interpreted in any cases. (If you know of one, please send it my way - I'd like to see it.) My sense is that this comment was adopted precisely to be more lenient with respect to the ban to pay others for referring clients, by opening the door to online services that connect clients with lawyers -- which is precisely what Avvo does. The problem is that there are a few things in the comment that have not been tested (at least to my knowledge). What is a "client lead"? Does that refer to information or to an actual client? If the intent is to allow payment for information but not for an actual client, then the comment won't help Avvo. Again, I have not done the research to know how "leads" has been interpreted (or is meant to be interpreted).
Also, and more importantly, what does it mean when it says that the payment won't violate Rule 7.2 as long as it is "consistent with" Rules 1.5 and 5.4. Is "consistent with" the same as "complies with" or is there a difference? If it means that in order for the payment not to violate 7.2 the lawyer also has to comply with 1.5(e) and 5.4, that means that payment to a non-lawyer will be in violation of 7.2 because sharing a fee with a non lawyer is by definition a violation of 5.4 and irrelevant to 1.5(e) which is about sharing fees with other lawyers. Since internet "lead generators" are not likely to be lawyers, I think that "consistent with" means something other than "complies with."
Viewed that way, the question becomes whether allowing payment to a non-lawyer for finding and sending a client to the lawyer threatens the policies and concerns for which we decided to adopt the requirements in 1.5(e) and the ban in 5.4. And I think Avvo can make a case that allowing this type of payment does not. I don't know how convincing the argument will be before the authorities, but you can make the argument. Which is why I don't understand why not go for this argument rather than the strange argument based on the First Amendment (which appears to be based on a forced interpretation of what the speech in question is and an incorrect reading of the constitutional standard that applies (note that Avvo's GC argues the state has to show harm, an argument the Supreme Court dismissed in Ohralik).
Having said all that, it seems Avvo is here to stay and that at least for now states are tolerating it. However, it will be interesting to see what happens in the near future. It will be interesting to see if attorneys ask their local Ethics Commissions to issue opinions on whether sharing fees with Avvo is ethical. Hopefully some will and we will begin to see the responses in different states.
It will also be interesting to see if states will then create regulations to apply to the non lawyers in the legal marketplace. The ABA just adopted a resolution urging jurisdictions to regulate the non lawyers in the legal services marketplace according to the policies and values of the legal profession. Ironically, this may lead to a finding that it is not a good idea to abandon the ban related to sharing fees with a non-lawyer.
Monday, February 8, 2016
Is it ethical to finance your law practice through "crowdfunding"? Opinions from New York and now Philadelphia address the issue -- UPDATED
I am updating this story with a new note (with links) about a recent opinion from Philadelphia at the end.
Back in March of last year I wrote about the differences of opinion as to whether it would ethical to finance the practice of law through "crowdfunding". See here. But there are different types of crowdfunding. In one type, the person seeking funds essentially is asking others to contribute out of the goodness of their hearts and promises nothing in return, other than the feeling of satisfaction they would get from contributing to a good cause. In the other, the person seeking funds raises capital in exchange for a portion of future income. In other words, through this type of crowdfunding websites, you can ask people to give you money and then promise to give them a share of your earnings.
The first type of crowdfunding is no different than asking a relative to give you money to start your practice; only instead of the relative you are asking strangers. In the second type of case, you would be sharing earnings with a stranger. And that would be a problem.
One of the most debated questions in Professional Responsibility circles today is whether to relax or eliminate the rules that ban lawyers from forming partnerships with non-lawyers or from sharing fees with non lawyers.
Because of these rules, it is not too surprising that the New York State Bar Association has decided that crowdfunding would be allowed only in instances where the result of the crowdfunding does not include sharing of fees with non lawyers. According to the opinion, available here,
UPDATE 8/20/15: Professional Liability Matters just posted a comment on the issue here.
UPDATE 2/8/16: Legal Ethics in Motion has a short comment on a recent Philadelphia Bar Association opinion on the same subject here. The opinion itself is available here. It raises a few interesting questions but I don't think it addresses the key issue: whether the people contribute to the fund acquire an interest in the litigation. The opinion seems to assume that the people who will fund the litigation do so out of the generosity of their hearts and will expect nothing in return. This is the type of crowdfunding that the NY opinion would allow because it does not involve any type of fee sharing. Thus, the Philadelphia Opinion does address a few important issues about that type of agreement, including whether the fund can be non-refundable, and whether it has to be kept in a trust account until earned.
Back in March of last year I wrote about the differences of opinion as to whether it would ethical to finance the practice of law through "crowdfunding". See here. But there are different types of crowdfunding. In one type, the person seeking funds essentially is asking others to contribute out of the goodness of their hearts and promises nothing in return, other than the feeling of satisfaction they would get from contributing to a good cause. In the other, the person seeking funds raises capital in exchange for a portion of future income. In other words, through this type of crowdfunding websites, you can ask people to give you money and then promise to give them a share of your earnings.
The first type of crowdfunding is no different than asking a relative to give you money to start your practice; only instead of the relative you are asking strangers. In the second type of case, you would be sharing earnings with a stranger. And that would be a problem.
One of the most debated questions in Professional Responsibility circles today is whether to relax or eliminate the rules that ban lawyers from forming partnerships with non-lawyers or from sharing fees with non lawyers.
Because of these rules, it is not too surprising that the New York State Bar Association has decided that crowdfunding would be allowed only in instances where the result of the crowdfunding does not include sharing of fees with non lawyers. According to the opinion, available here,
A law firm may engage in certain types of crowdfunding but not others. Any form of fundraising that gives the investor an interest in a law firm or a share of its revenue would be prohibited. However, in some circumstances a law firm may give the funding source some kind of reward. For example, a law firm may send a funder non-confidential memoranda discussing legal issues (provided the law firm complies with any applicable advertising rules), or may agree that the law firm will provide pro bono legal services to certain charitable organizations, provided that the lawyer complies with Rule 1.1 regarding competence and the representation does not involve conflicts in violation of Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.For a more detailed discussion of the opinion go here.
UPDATE 8/20/15: Professional Liability Matters just posted a comment on the issue here.
UPDATE 2/8/16: Legal Ethics in Motion has a short comment on a recent Philadelphia Bar Association opinion on the same subject here. The opinion itself is available here. It raises a few interesting questions but I don't think it addresses the key issue: whether the people contribute to the fund acquire an interest in the litigation. The opinion seems to assume that the people who will fund the litigation do so out of the generosity of their hearts and will expect nothing in return. This is the type of crowdfunding that the NY opinion would allow because it does not involve any type of fee sharing. Thus, the Philadelphia Opinion does address a few important issues about that type of agreement, including whether the fund can be non-refundable, and whether it has to be kept in a trust account until earned.
Thursday, January 28, 2016
Does the requirement of a "certificate of merit" in a malpractice case apply to a claim under a different theory of liability?
Some states require an “affidavit of
merit” in order for a plaintiff to bring a malpractice claim. The blog Professional Liability Matters has prepared this 50
state survey-table with the relevant information.
It is my understanding that typically these statutes refer to claims for "malpractice" while others mention the word "negligence." For this reason, there may some doubt as to whether a plaintiff bringing a claim for a different cause of action, such as a breach of fiduciary duty or an intentional tort, would be required to use of a certificate of merit.
The question is right now being litigated in New Jersey. Just a few days ago, in Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 2016 BL 7198, N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., No. A-3268-14T2, 1/12/16, the court held that the New Jersey statute that requires malpractice plaintiffs to file an affidavit of merit attesting to the viability of the complaint doesn't apply to a lawsuit accusing an attorney of malicious use of process. Keep an eye on the case to see if the issue reaches the NJ Supreme Court. For more on the case go here.
It is my understanding that typically these statutes refer to claims for "malpractice" while others mention the word "negligence." For this reason, there may some doubt as to whether a plaintiff bringing a claim for a different cause of action, such as a breach of fiduciary duty or an intentional tort, would be required to use of a certificate of merit.
The question is right now being litigated in New Jersey. Just a few days ago, in Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 2016 BL 7198, N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., No. A-3268-14T2, 1/12/16, the court held that the New Jersey statute that requires malpractice plaintiffs to file an affidavit of merit attesting to the viability of the complaint doesn't apply to a lawsuit accusing an attorney of malicious use of process. Keep an eye on the case to see if the issue reaches the NJ Supreme Court. For more on the case go here.
Wednesday, January 27, 2016
California Bar Ethics Committee issues opinion on acceptable "puffing" during negotiations
The California Bar's Ethics Committee recently issued an opinion on whether an attorney negotiating for a client can engage in some forms of “exaggeration, posturing or puffing,” such as overstating the client's “bottom line” settlement number. See Formal Op. 2015-194.
The Committee concluded that exaggeration, posturing and ‘puffing’ are acceptable but that statements that constitute misrepresentations of material fact upon which the opposing party is intended to rely are impermissible.
According to a report in the BNA/ABA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct, the committee generally embraced the analysis the ABA ethics committee used in its 2006 opinion on the subject, ABA Formal Ethics Op. 06-439. You can read the report here.
The Committee concluded that exaggeration, posturing and ‘puffing’ are acceptable but that statements that constitute misrepresentations of material fact upon which the opposing party is intended to rely are impermissible.
According to a report in the BNA/ABA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct, the committee generally embraced the analysis the ABA ethics committee used in its 2006 opinion on the subject, ABA Formal Ethics Op. 06-439. You can read the report here.
Monday, January 25, 2016
Avvo joins the legal market; now offers legal services through network of attorneys; should attorneys be concerned?
Avvo, the somewhat controversial (here and here) online rating company, has evolved into what it calls an online legal services marketplace now offering fixed-fee, limited-scope legal services through a network of attorneys. This is not surprising since the company's CEO has participated in a number of events calling for the opening of the legal market to outsiders and the elimination of regulation on the unauthorized practice of law to open the way for Avvo itself to join the market. (You can see a video of one of these events here.)
Finding new ways to provide access to legal representation, including by relaxing some regulations, is not necessarily a bad thing. But one must be careful not to make mistakes since the regulations have not been relaxed yet.
As I have argued before, the new buzzword in Legal Ethics these days is the notion of "innovation" and states and the ABA are trying to find ways to encourage innovation. Yet we shouldn't rush to try to be innovative at the risk of creating other problems. I have no problem with innovation, or change or new initiatives, and I most certainly don't have a problem in trying to find ways to provide access to legal services for people who can't afford them, but whatever is done should be done with a full understanding of the professional responsibility principles involved and of the possible consequences for possible mistakes.
Not too long ago, I made that observation when commenting on the ABA initiative with a company called Rocket Lawyer (another one of those so called online legal services marketplaces). You can read my comment here.
I am repeating it now in light of the announcement that Avvo is now offering "legal services through a network of attorneys."
Avvo first got into the business of offering legal advice last year when it launched Avvo Advisor, a service that provides on-demand legal advice by phone for a fixed fee of $39 for 15 minutes. Just a couple of weeks ago, however, the ABA Journal.com reported that Avvo has begun testing a service that offers fixed-fee, limited-scope legal services through a network of attorneys, and plans to roll out the service more broadly over the next few months. (You should also read the comments posted at the end of the ABA Journal story.)
That's a whole different ballgame and one that deserves a closer look.
As described elsewhere, attorneys can sign up with Avvo to offer services by agreeing to pay a "marketing fee" the value of which will depend on the services rendered. Clients would choose an attorney from those registered with Avvo and form an attorney-client relationship with the attorney (not with Avvo). Avvo essentially serves as a means for the client to find an attorney.
Viewed this way, Avvo is essentially helping people find a lawyer who can serve their needs. Yet, Avvo claims it is not a referral service. Why? Maybe because lawyers have to pay Avvo a fee to get Avvo to connect them with clients, and the rules in most, if not all, jurisdictions say it is unethical to pay a third party for recommendations or referrals except under certain circumstances. Thus, ABA Model Rule 7.2(b), which has been adopted in the vast majority of jurisdictions, states that “[a] lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may . . . pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service that has been approved by an appropriate regulatory authority. . . .” Avvo is a for profit business. Whether it is "a qualified referral service" depends on the law of each jurisdiction.
But, as long as you are willing to take Avvo's word for it, the is question moot anyway because Avvo clearly states in its website that it is not a referral service. So, there.
This brings us to the issues that arise when we start to look at how money is exchanged and what the money pays for.
Here is what Avvo itself says about this in the FAQ section of its website:
Of course, I am sure that Avvo believes its service does not violate the rules of professional conduct, but the fact they believe it, by itself, does not make it so. Do your own research before you commit to something that might become a problem.
Start by taking a look at what Avvo says about fee splitting: "Fee splits are not inherently unethical. They only become a problem if the split creates a situation that may compromise a lawyer’s professional independence of judgment."
That statement is, at best, confusing. Let’s start with the basics. Model Rule 5.4, which has been adopted in pretty much every jurisdiction, states clearly that a it is misconduct to share a fee with a non-lawyer except under one of four enumerated circumstances and, at least the way I read it, the agreement described by Avvo does not fall within any of them. Of course, however, it is possible that a particular jurisdiction has different language that would recognize the validity of this type of agreement, and some jurisdictions have ethical opinions that have concluded it would be OK to share a fee with a non professional under certain circumstances.
Thus, at least as far as the Model Rule is concerned, unless allowed by one of the specific exceptions, splitting fees with a non lawyer is unethical, inherently or otherwise. It just is. Why? Because the rules say so, period. Because the rules take the view that splitting fees with a non lawyer inherently creates a situation that may compromise a lawyer's professional independent judgment. In other words, according to the Model Rules, splitting fees with non-lawyers is inherently unethical.
If you are going to argue the specific agreement does not violate the rule, you are going to have to develop some sort of analysis to show the agreement is not an example of splitting a fee.
Avvo wants it both ways. They claim, without analysis, that their program does not constitute splitting fees, but, just in case, they also claim that even if it is, splitting fees is not unethical unless there is a conflict of interest. Problem is there is no analysis to support the first part of this conclusion and the second part is contrary to the state of the law.
As an aside, I am assuming here, of course, that Avvo does not want to be considered a law firm. If it is a law firm, then the applicable rule is 1.5(e), which allows the splitting of fees among lawyers in different firms. Yet, Avvo would not want that rule to apply because this is allowed only if the requirements in that rule are strictly met, which is not the case in the Avvo type business relationship with the lawyer.
So, this brings us back to the question of whether the Avvo-Lawyer agreement does or does not constitute splitting of a legal fee with a non-lawyer (which, as stated above would be a clear violation of the rules).
According to Avvo, here is how the service works: A customer selects a lawyer for a particular legal need through the Avvo website and pays for the service the full flat fee assigned for that service up-front. Avvo retains that money until after the service is performed. Then, on the 7th of the month, Avvo will send the lawyer the full fee, and in a separate transaction will deduct a “per-service marketing fee” for each completed legal service. The amount of this fee depends on the service, and ranges from a $40 marketing fee for a $149 service to a $400 marketing fee for a $2995 service. Avvo specifically says the withdrawal of the service fee is a separate transaction “to avoid any fee-splitting concerns.”
[By the way, note that Avvo pays the attorney on the 7th of the month, not when the work is completed, so God forbid you finish the work on the 8th or you’ll have to wait a month for your check... But I digress.]
What could go wrong? Let’s review.
Let’s start with the fact that when a client pays for services up-front, a lawyer has an ethical obligation to keep a client’s money in a separate trust account, which in many jurisdictions has to be an interest bearing account (IOLTA) account. Since most jurisdictions have held that flat fees are not earned upon payment, by definition (at least in those jurisdictions) they fall in the category of fees that need to be in a trust account. According to the Avvo plan, however, the lawyer is allowing Avvo to handle those fees with (to my knowledge) no assurance that the fee will be held in a trust account, much less an IOLTA account, with the interest paid to the appropriate state agency. That could be a problem.
Then let’s think about the second transaction. The first thing to notice is that the amount of the so-called marketing fee varies depending on the amount of the flat fee. Unless I am missing something, this sounds to me like the marketing fee is really a percentage of the attorney’s fee. You’d have to do the math to determine the amount of the percentage, but since both fees are pre-determined, it shouldn’t be difficult. So, what is really happening here is that Avvo is collecting a percentage of the fee the client pays the attorney. The fact it does it separately, in a second transaction, does not change that fact. Does that sound to you like splitting a fee with a non-lawyer?
Next, does anyone see anything wrong with a lawyer giving Avvo direct access to a lawyer’s (or the firm’s) bank account so Avvo can make withdrawals directly? I see two issues here. You can see the problem if the attorney gives Avvo access to the firm's trust account, right? First, giving anyone (other than the bank) access to that account in and of itself is a problem. Second, when Avvo takes money out of that account to pay for the marketing fee, the lawyer is by definition using client money to pay for operating expenses. That's, at least, commingling.
Maybe these problems can be avoided by giving Avvo access to the firm's operating or general account. I suppose that would be OK in terms of ethical issues, but I wonder whether it is a good idea. This is a personal decision, but I wouldn't feel comfortable giving others the ability to take money out of my bank account directly... but that's just me... I would want assurances on the security measures taken to protect my bank account information. I don't want my account to be vulnerable if the other company gets hacked and my information is stolen or misplaced or something... Maybe, the best option is for the lawyer to open an account to be used only for transactions with Avvo. That could work, if that is something Avvo would agree to. None of this has to do with the rules of professional conduct or ethics, though... So let's get back to that discussion.
So after all this, what is Avvo and what is it doing? If Avvo is not a referral service, and it doesn't want to be considered to be a provider of legal services (a law firm) either, we are forced to go back to the issue of splitting fees with a non-lawyer.
When it talks to consumers Avvo says it "offers legal services" but when it talks to lawyers and its regulators it says we offer "a platform" for "marketing" of legal services. If Avvo is offering legal services then it should be subject to the same regulations that all legal services providers are subject to. If it isn't then the lawyers it serves need to make sure that by entering into agreements with it, the lawyers don't violate the rules the lawyers are subject to.
Maybe I am missing something here. Please explain it to me if I am.
Now, having said all that, I want to be clear that what I am saying here is simply that I have some concerns over whether agreeing to participate in the system designed by Avvo would violate the rules. I am not saying that it is necessarily a bad idea to find a way to make it work. Maybe it is a good idea for potential clients to have access to legal services through platforms like Avvo, RocketLawyer or LegalZoom. That is a different question. If it is, then we need to work to change the current rules. I have no problem with that.
For more on this go here.
UPDATE (2-10-16): Part II of my comment on Avvo Legal Services.
UPDATE (4-9-16): Avvo now offers legal forms. My comments here.
UPDATE (6-19-16): Ohio opinion suggests participating in Avvo Legal Services might be unethical
UPDATE (8-1-16): Florida adopts rules that make it unethical to participate in program like Avvo Legal Services
UPDATE (8-12-16): South Carolina opinion finds participating in program like Avvo Legal services unethical
UPDATE (10-10-16): Pennsylvania issues opinion finding participating in program like Avvo Legal Services is unethical.
Finding new ways to provide access to legal representation, including by relaxing some regulations, is not necessarily a bad thing. But one must be careful not to make mistakes since the regulations have not been relaxed yet.
As I have argued before, the new buzzword in Legal Ethics these days is the notion of "innovation" and states and the ABA are trying to find ways to encourage innovation. Yet we shouldn't rush to try to be innovative at the risk of creating other problems. I have no problem with innovation, or change or new initiatives, and I most certainly don't have a problem in trying to find ways to provide access to legal services for people who can't afford them, but whatever is done should be done with a full understanding of the professional responsibility principles involved and of the possible consequences for possible mistakes.
Not too long ago, I made that observation when commenting on the ABA initiative with a company called Rocket Lawyer (another one of those so called online legal services marketplaces). You can read my comment here.
I am repeating it now in light of the announcement that Avvo is now offering "legal services through a network of attorneys."
Avvo first got into the business of offering legal advice last year when it launched Avvo Advisor, a service that provides on-demand legal advice by phone for a fixed fee of $39 for 15 minutes. Just a couple of weeks ago, however, the ABA Journal.com reported that Avvo has begun testing a service that offers fixed-fee, limited-scope legal services through a network of attorneys, and plans to roll out the service more broadly over the next few months. (You should also read the comments posted at the end of the ABA Journal story.)
That's a whole different ballgame and one that deserves a closer look.
As described elsewhere, attorneys can sign up with Avvo to offer services by agreeing to pay a "marketing fee" the value of which will depend on the services rendered. Clients would choose an attorney from those registered with Avvo and form an attorney-client relationship with the attorney (not with Avvo). Avvo essentially serves as a means for the client to find an attorney.
Viewed this way, Avvo is essentially helping people find a lawyer who can serve their needs. Yet, Avvo claims it is not a referral service. Why? Maybe because lawyers have to pay Avvo a fee to get Avvo to connect them with clients, and the rules in most, if not all, jurisdictions say it is unethical to pay a third party for recommendations or referrals except under certain circumstances. Thus, ABA Model Rule 7.2(b), which has been adopted in the vast majority of jurisdictions, states that “[a] lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may . . . pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service that has been approved by an appropriate regulatory authority. . . .” Avvo is a for profit business. Whether it is "a qualified referral service" depends on the law of each jurisdiction.
But, as long as you are willing to take Avvo's word for it, the is question moot anyway because Avvo clearly states in its website that it is not a referral service. So, there.
This brings us to the issues that arise when we start to look at how money is exchanged and what the money pays for.
Here is what Avvo itself says about this in the FAQ section of its website:
"Should I be concerned about fee-splitting? No. Avvo always sends you 100% of the client’s payment. As a completely separate transaction, you will pay a per-service marketing fee. We know this issue is extremely important to participating attorneys. Here’s what ethics expert and Avvo General Counsel Josh King says on the matter, "Fee splits are not inherently unethical. They only become a problem if the split creates a situation that may compromise a lawyer’s professional independence of judgment. We believe that Avvo Legal Services fees, like credit card fees, would involve the sort of technical fee split that would not create such a potential for compromise. Nonetheless, we have tried to keep things simple and clear by making the per-service marketing fee a separate charge."
. . . . Does this count as fee splitting? No. As mentioned in the ethics section of this FAQ, Avvo always sends you the entire legal fee paid by the client. The per-service marketing fee is a completely separate transaction. We know this is extremely important to participating attorneys. Here’s what ethics expert and Avvo General Counsel Josh King says on the matter, "Fee splits are not inherently unethical. They only become a problem if the split creates a situation that may compromise a lawyer’s professional independence of judgment. We believe that Avvo Legal Services fees, like credit card fees, would involve the sort of technical fee split that would not create such a potential for compromise. Nonetheless, we have tried to keep things simple and clear by making the per-service marketing fee a separate charge.”
Of course, I am sure that Avvo believes its service does not violate the rules of professional conduct, but the fact they believe it, by itself, does not make it so. Do your own research before you commit to something that might become a problem.
Start by taking a look at what Avvo says about fee splitting: "Fee splits are not inherently unethical. They only become a problem if the split creates a situation that may compromise a lawyer’s professional independence of judgment."
That statement is, at best, confusing. Let’s start with the basics. Model Rule 5.4, which has been adopted in pretty much every jurisdiction, states clearly that a it is misconduct to share a fee with a non-lawyer except under one of four enumerated circumstances and, at least the way I read it, the agreement described by Avvo does not fall within any of them. Of course, however, it is possible that a particular jurisdiction has different language that would recognize the validity of this type of agreement, and some jurisdictions have ethical opinions that have concluded it would be OK to share a fee with a non professional under certain circumstances.
Thus, at least as far as the Model Rule is concerned, unless allowed by one of the specific exceptions, splitting fees with a non lawyer is unethical, inherently or otherwise. It just is. Why? Because the rules say so, period. Because the rules take the view that splitting fees with a non lawyer inherently creates a situation that may compromise a lawyer's professional independent judgment. In other words, according to the Model Rules, splitting fees with non-lawyers is inherently unethical.
If you are going to argue the specific agreement does not violate the rule, you are going to have to develop some sort of analysis to show the agreement is not an example of splitting a fee.
Avvo wants it both ways. They claim, without analysis, that their program does not constitute splitting fees, but, just in case, they also claim that even if it is, splitting fees is not unethical unless there is a conflict of interest. Problem is there is no analysis to support the first part of this conclusion and the second part is contrary to the state of the law.
As an aside, I am assuming here, of course, that Avvo does not want to be considered a law firm. If it is a law firm, then the applicable rule is 1.5(e), which allows the splitting of fees among lawyers in different firms. Yet, Avvo would not want that rule to apply because this is allowed only if the requirements in that rule are strictly met, which is not the case in the Avvo type business relationship with the lawyer.
So, this brings us back to the question of whether the Avvo-Lawyer agreement does or does not constitute splitting of a legal fee with a non-lawyer (which, as stated above would be a clear violation of the rules).
According to Avvo, here is how the service works: A customer selects a lawyer for a particular legal need through the Avvo website and pays for the service the full flat fee assigned for that service up-front. Avvo retains that money until after the service is performed. Then, on the 7th of the month, Avvo will send the lawyer the full fee, and in a separate transaction will deduct a “per-service marketing fee” for each completed legal service. The amount of this fee depends on the service, and ranges from a $40 marketing fee for a $149 service to a $400 marketing fee for a $2995 service. Avvo specifically says the withdrawal of the service fee is a separate transaction “to avoid any fee-splitting concerns.”
[By the way, note that Avvo pays the attorney on the 7th of the month, not when the work is completed, so God forbid you finish the work on the 8th or you’ll have to wait a month for your check... But I digress.]
What could go wrong? Let’s review.
Let’s start with the fact that when a client pays for services up-front, a lawyer has an ethical obligation to keep a client’s money in a separate trust account, which in many jurisdictions has to be an interest bearing account (IOLTA) account. Since most jurisdictions have held that flat fees are not earned upon payment, by definition (at least in those jurisdictions) they fall in the category of fees that need to be in a trust account. According to the Avvo plan, however, the lawyer is allowing Avvo to handle those fees with (to my knowledge) no assurance that the fee will be held in a trust account, much less an IOLTA account, with the interest paid to the appropriate state agency. That could be a problem.
Then let’s think about the second transaction. The first thing to notice is that the amount of the so-called marketing fee varies depending on the amount of the flat fee. Unless I am missing something, this sounds to me like the marketing fee is really a percentage of the attorney’s fee. You’d have to do the math to determine the amount of the percentage, but since both fees are pre-determined, it shouldn’t be difficult. So, what is really happening here is that Avvo is collecting a percentage of the fee the client pays the attorney. The fact it does it separately, in a second transaction, does not change that fact. Does that sound to you like splitting a fee with a non-lawyer?
Next, does anyone see anything wrong with a lawyer giving Avvo direct access to a lawyer’s (or the firm’s) bank account so Avvo can make withdrawals directly? I see two issues here. You can see the problem if the attorney gives Avvo access to the firm's trust account, right? First, giving anyone (other than the bank) access to that account in and of itself is a problem. Second, when Avvo takes money out of that account to pay for the marketing fee, the lawyer is by definition using client money to pay for operating expenses. That's, at least, commingling.
Maybe these problems can be avoided by giving Avvo access to the firm's operating or general account. I suppose that would be OK in terms of ethical issues, but I wonder whether it is a good idea. This is a personal decision, but I wouldn't feel comfortable giving others the ability to take money out of my bank account directly... but that's just me... I would want assurances on the security measures taken to protect my bank account information. I don't want my account to be vulnerable if the other company gets hacked and my information is stolen or misplaced or something... Maybe, the best option is for the lawyer to open an account to be used only for transactions with Avvo. That could work, if that is something Avvo would agree to. None of this has to do with the rules of professional conduct or ethics, though... So let's get back to that discussion.
So after all this, what is Avvo and what is it doing? If Avvo is not a referral service, and it doesn't want to be considered to be a provider of legal services (a law firm) either, we are forced to go back to the issue of splitting fees with a non-lawyer.
When it talks to consumers Avvo says it "offers legal services" but when it talks to lawyers and its regulators it says we offer "a platform" for "marketing" of legal services. If Avvo is offering legal services then it should be subject to the same regulations that all legal services providers are subject to. If it isn't then the lawyers it serves need to make sure that by entering into agreements with it, the lawyers don't violate the rules the lawyers are subject to.
Maybe I am missing something here. Please explain it to me if I am.
Now, having said all that, I want to be clear that what I am saying here is simply that I have some concerns over whether agreeing to participate in the system designed by Avvo would violate the rules. I am not saying that it is necessarily a bad idea to find a way to make it work. Maybe it is a good idea for potential clients to have access to legal services through platforms like Avvo, RocketLawyer or LegalZoom. That is a different question. If it is, then we need to work to change the current rules. I have no problem with that.
For more on this go here.
UPDATE (2-10-16): Part II of my comment on Avvo Legal Services.
UPDATE (4-9-16): Avvo now offers legal forms. My comments here.
UPDATE (6-19-16): Ohio opinion suggests participating in Avvo Legal Services might be unethical
UPDATE (8-1-16): Florida adopts rules that make it unethical to participate in program like Avvo Legal Services
UPDATE (8-12-16): South Carolina opinion finds participating in program like Avvo Legal services unethical
UPDATE (10-10-16): Pennsylvania issues opinion finding participating in program like Avvo Legal Services is unethical.
Sunday, January 24, 2016
Comment on process to adopt new rule regarding prosecutorial misconduct in California - UPDATED
I have posted some links to comment on the on going process in California for the possible adoption of new rules. (Go here and scroll down.) The most recent development, reported in The Legal Ethics Forum some time ago, is that the Commission seems to be considering "fast tracking" some rules while waiting on others. One of the rules the Commission seems to be interested in fast tracking is a rule on the duties of prosecutors (presumably akin to Model Rule 3.8). On that topic, Kafkaesq has a comment here.
UPDATE (12-9-15): Legal Ethics Forum has an update here.
UPDATE (1/24/16): KafkaEsq has a new comment on the proposed new rule and asks whether it will ever be used, here. The author is skeptical that the rule will make much of a difference.
UPDATE (12-9-15): Legal Ethics Forum has an update here.
UPDATE (1/24/16): KafkaEsq has a new comment on the proposed new rule and asks whether it will ever be used, here. The author is skeptical that the rule will make much of a difference.
Thursday, January 21, 2016
Should the ABA adopt a new rule making it misconduct to engage in discriminatory conduct?
As I reported back in August, the ABA is considering an amendment to Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to address issues of harassment and discrimination based on a proposal by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility ("the Committee"). The proposed amendment (and other materials in support of the proposal) are available here.
According to the Committee, at least 24 U.S. jurisdictions have adopted some form of anti-bias, anti-prejudice and/or anti-harassment rule as part of their lawyer conduct rules. But the rules vary significantly and the Committee is trying to find a good way to compromise all the concerns and interests.
There is no question that manifestations of prejudice, bias and discrimination are always a cause for concern. However, as I have been thinking about the issue, I find myself torn. I understand the interest behind the proposal but I also have some concerns about the proposed rule. I am working on a longer article on this, but while I do so, I thought I would share some of my initial thoughts on the matter.
After I was done writing this, I realized the post came out to be much longer than I expected - and probably rambling too - so let me insert a few bullet points here before you start reading the whole thing:
1. The Model Rules do not address issues related to bias or discrimination in the practice of law, and the current approach to the issue expressed in the comment to Rule 8.4 is actually worse than the Committee believes it to be.
2. Thus, if you think there ought to be a rule on this topic, there certainly is a good argument for enacting one. Yet the question is whether there ought to be a rule to begin with.
3. I am not opposed to enacting a rule, but I am also not convinced that we need one.
4. If we are going to have a rule, the proposed rule is a good start but needs to be adjusted.
5. At the very least, the rule should make it part of the rule (as opposed to the comment) that it won’t apply to conduct or speech protected by the First Amendment.
6. The rule should make clear how it can, or can’t, be applied to the decision to accept or reject clients. Personally, I think the rule should not apply to the client selection process.
Now here are the details:
The current state of the law
Current Model Rule 8.4(d) (and most, if not all, of its state equivalents) consider misconduct to engage in conduct that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice." In addition, paragraph 3 of the comment to Model Rule 8.4 states that “[a] lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. ...”
There are several problems with this comment. First, it suggests there could be discipline on the basis of speech. Note that it talks about manifesting “by words or conduct.” Manifesting means expressing and expressing an idea by words is, by definition, speech. So I have a problem with the suggestion that the state can discipline an attorney for expressing an idea, even if that idea is offensive to some. It seems to me that if the First Amendment stands for something, it stands for the proposition that the state has very limited authority to regulate speech simply because someone might find that speech offensive.
Second, contrary to what the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility says in its memo in support of the Draft Proposal, the comment does not say that expressing bias or prejudice while representing a client is prejudicial to the administration of justice (and thus could subject the lawyer to possible discipline). It only states that if engaging in that conduct is against the administration of justice then the lawyer could be subject to discipline for violating the ban against conduct that is against the administration of justice.
The current comment, thus, suggests that under certain circumstances knowingly manifesting bias or prejudice would not constitute conduct against the administration of justice and, thus, would not be the basis for discipline. For this reason, if one thinks that discriminatory or biased conduct should always be considered to be misconduct, given what the current comment actually states, the argument for a new rule is actually stronger than the one currently advanced by the Committee.
But, putting aside that initial misunderstanding as to what the current comment says, the question remains whether it is a good idea to amend the rule as proposed.
What is the policy behind the proposal?
In support of the proposal, the Committee cites a resolution drafted by members of the Oregon New Lawyers Division which states, among other things, that “[t]here is a need for a cultural shift in understanding the inherent integrity of people regardless of their race, color, national origin, religion, age, sex, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, marital status, or disability, to be captured in the rules of professional conduct.”
I totally agree that there is a need for a cultural shift, but I am still unclear as to why it needs to be captured (or why it would be a good idea to capture it) in the rules of professional conduct.
In response to that question, the resolution continues saying that the need arises “because the Model Rules are supposed to ensure the integrity of the legal profession.”
But is that really the purpose of the rules of professional conduct? According to the Scope section of the Model Rules, the Rules of Professional Conduct “simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law” and the basis for the imposition of discipline when the conduct of a lawyer violates that framework. I have never been particularly fond of arguments for discipline based on a need to protect “the integrity of the profession.” What is “the integrity of the profession” if not a subjective concept based on a value judgment the state seems to want to impose upon all members of the profession? Isn’t it as vague as “the appearance of impropriety” which has been generally abandoned as a standard for evaluating what ought to be considered misconduct?
As has been argued elsewhere, discrimination is a social evil and the Rules of Professional Conduct are not necessarily designed to address social evils; they are yardsticks by which we measure the fitness of lawyers to practice.
Now, one might say that someone who believes in discrimination or who behaves in a discriminatory manner is not fit to practice law. Yet, I don’t think that’s the case. Aside from the much criticized case involving white supremacist Matthew Hale in Illinois, denying someone the right to practice law because they believe (or have expressed that they believe) in discrimination could be interpreted to be a violation of the First Amendment. Also, lawyers are allowed to discriminate in certain aspects of the practice of law (more about that later).
Thus, I am concerned about possible regulation of speech based on a value judgment about whether a certain expression is an affront to the “integrity of the profession.” This was the kind of reasoning used to exclude Matthew Hale by a panel that found that his "publicly displayed views are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit" of the Rules of Professional Conduct” and that “in regulating the conduct of attorneys, certain "fundamental truths" of equality and nondiscrimination "must be preferred over the values found in the First Amendment."
The proposed new rule 8.4 seems to be based on a very similar notion that there is a fundamental value, which can be enforced through the disciplinary process, in equality and nondiscrimination.
Freedom of speech
One concern over adopting “anti-bias” rules is that if the rule is not drafted carefully it may be subject to attack for regulating constitutionally protected speech, even if the state can, and already does, regulate attorneys' speech in other contexts.
Take for example a recent case in New York in which a lawyer was suspended for, among other things, having made “patently offensive racial, ethnic, homophobic, sexist, and other derogatory remarks to attorneys.” The case is Matter of Teague and it is available here.
The opinion does not really explain the context of the statements other than saying they were uttered “to attorneys.” The court suggests that the attorney in question “spewed racist, sexist, homophobic and offensive epithets against other attorneys that any reasonable person, let alone a reasonable attorney, would know are simply unacceptable in public discourse,” but it is not clear, when or where, those epithets were uttered. Again, the decision seems to be based on the notion that certain expressions are inherently unacceptable and, thus, can subject an attorney to discipline.
The court concluded that “Respondent’s conduct should not and will not be tolerated.” This conclusion is fine as to the other “conduct” involved in the case (disruptive conduct in hearings) and maybe for conduct that can be argued to be prejudicial to the administration of justice (as I assume was the case in that case), but not necessarily as to the content of the attorney's speech in all circumstances.
Would it be permissible for the state to discipline a lawyer for expressing bias at a social event? ...during conversation with a stranger at a bar? ... during a political rally? Would it be permissible for a state to discipline an attorney because the attorney is a member of a group that expresses bias against others? ...or a member of a church that expresses bias against women or other religious groups?
Smartly, the drafters of the new proposed rule eliminated the reference to expressions by words (although the new language does not necessarily limit the rule’s application to conduct) and added a new statement in the comment to the rule explaining that the rule does not apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Thus, according to the comment, which is elsewhere described as a guide to the interpretation of the rule, a lawyer could not be disciplined for prejudiced, biased or harassing speech if the speech is "unrelated to the practice of law or protected by the First Amendment."
I like that, but how would we apply this standard to a lawyer who rejects a case because the prospective client is gay and the lawyer says he objects to gays on religious reasons? Isn’t the lawyer engaging in discriminatory conduct? Does this mean that some discriminatory conduct is permitted by the rules? If so, how is that different from the current approach, which says some discriminatory conduct is not prejudicial to the administration of justice?
And then there is the fact that not all jurisdictions adopt the comments. What would happen in such a jurisdiction? Could the use of the word “harass” be interpreted to apply to speech? After all, one can harass someone else by expressing offensive speech. Could the Matthew Hale denial of admission then become support for the notion that there are certain fundamental values, including a value in non discrimination, that could be enforced by the imposition of discipline?
Here is another problem. As currently drafted, the rule says it is professional misconduct to “harass or knowingly discriminate.” Doesn’t this mean that there can be discipline if you unknowingly harass someone? This is a dangerous proposition. What if a lawyer is accused of engaging in “microaggressions,” which have been defined as happening below the level of awareness of well-intentioned members of the dominant culture? Does the fact that the microaggression is expressed with words by definition place it under the protection of the First Amendment and, therefore, outside the reach of the proposed rule? What if the microaggression is not expressed but the result of conduct? Will disciplinary agencies need to go into interpretations of what was meant by a certain conduct or attitude and whether it can be interpreted to be offensive to the complainant?
For an article critical of the concept of microaggressions go here. For an article critical of using microaggressions as the basis for disciplinary actions (in a context other than law) go here.
The Committee’s memo in support of the proposed new rule states that “[t]he terms “harassment” and “discrimination” are defined terms under law; they refer to the adverse, negative consequences of conduct that manifests bias or prejudice.” Yet, the Committee does not state which law, statute or doctrine should be used to define the terms and the definition it provides does not adequately limit what could be a very broad interpretation of the concepts, including the notion of microaggressions.
In contrast, Illinois Rule 8.4(g) holds it is misconduct to violate a federal, state or local statute or ordinance that prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status by conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer. In this way, the rule of professional conduct limits its application to conduct that is determined to be discriminatory by other defined and applicable statutes and standards. This seems to be preferable than to base the determination of what is discriminatory on whether it is offensive to the integrity of the profession. For a discussion of this issue under California law, go here.
Duty to report misconduct?
Moving on... Here is another concern. Under Rule 8.3 attorneys have a duty to report misconduct of other attorneys under certain circumstances. Would attorneys now be subject to discipline if they don’t report another attorney’s offensive conduct? What if the conduct is offensive to another person but not to the attorney who fails to report it? And what if the conduct is part of an expression by words? (Note how much of the problem for me keeps coming back to the issue of the protection of speech vs. conduct and the interaction with the First Amendment. Is the end result that we can impose discipline for discriminatory conduct but have to tolerate discriminatory speech?)
The ABA Journal.com recently asked readers to post whether they had ever heard sexist comments at work. You can see the responses here. How many of these would trigger the proposed rule and, therefore, the duty to report by those who heard the comments? Or, again, is the fact that they were "comments," which by definition is different from "conduct" mean that comments don't count?
Is the proposed rule too broad?
Shouldn’t certain types of discriminatory conduct be subject to discipline? Sure. There are plenty of examples out there of lawyers who have been duly disciplined for harassing and discriminatory conduct. But usually the conduct is also a violation of other regulation or statutes, and there didn’t seem to be a need to create new rules to impose discipline.
The proposed new rule not only creates a specific rule, it uses language that expands on the reach of the current comment. Whereas the current comment to Model Rule 8.4 applies to conduct “in the course of representing a client,” the new rule would apply to “conduct related to the practice of law.”
As the Committee explains in its memo in support of the proposal, there are arguments for and against this change, but it determined that the arguments for the new language is more compelling.
The question for me is whether the new rule, with the new language, would make a difference. It seems like it would, but not necessarily by creating new situations in which discipline would be available. Take for example a case in which a lawyer sexually harasses a law firm colleague. Currently, this situation could result in discipline in one of two ways. First, discipline could be imposed as the result of a finding, after whatever procedure applies, of an actual violation of the law. This would require the person who suffered the harassment to bring a complaint, and for that claim to be resolved through the proper process. In the alternative, the disciplinary agency could impose sanctions based on a finding that the conduct should be deemed to be “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” One might think this is a stretch, but there are plenty of cases out there that have resulted in discipline for conduct based on this standard.
To avoid having to stretch the use of the notion of “the administration of justice,” however, it might not be a bad idea to create a new rule. This also eliminates the dependency on other procedures before discipline can be imposed. As the Committee has said, the fact that legal remedies exist for those who suffer workplace harassment or discrimination at the hands of lawyers isn't reason enough to exclude that behavior from the scope of the proposed rule.
The biggest change the new rule could create in a situation like this one is that the person who was harassed does not even need to complain at all for a claim to be initiated. If the conduct is observed by another lawyer, presumably that lawyer has a duty to report it and a disciplinary action could be initiated based on that observation. Obviously, without the corroboration or cooperation of the person who was harassed the case would be weak, but that is a different issue.
The point here is that the expansion of the language in the proposed new rule could have the effect of bringing more conduct within the application of the rule; but only as long as the conduct is not protected by the First Amendment or exempted by the rule itself. Suppose that a lawyer gets drunk at a firm party and directs homophobic or racial slurs at a co-worker. Would the lawyer be subject to discipline? Probably not, whether under the current state of the law, nor under the new proposed rule.
Are lawyers allowed to discriminate when choosing clients?
I mentioned above that one possible problem with the new rule could be the fact that lawyers are allowed to discriminate in certain aspects of the practice of law. This is particularly true when it comes to selecting clients. It is generally accepted that lawyers are free to reject the representation of prospective clients for any number of reasons. Some firms actually do so based on gender. Take for example this law firm, or this one, for example.
By choosing to represent only men, or women, a firm, by definition is engaged in discrimination. It may be permissible discrimination, but discrimination it is. The question is whether the new rule recognizes a distinction between discrimination that is permissible or whether it would ban the kind of practice engaged in by firms that specialize in representing men or women in divorce cases.
This question reminds me of the debate generated by Stropnicky v. Nathanson, a case in which a Hearing Commissioner for the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ruled that a woman lawyer could not refuse to represent men in divorce actions under the state's public accommodation statute. The lawyer was fined, but she was not subject to discipline. Under the new rule, presumably she would be.
Stropnicky generated a healthy debate on whether the application of a state’s anti-discrimination statute to a lawyer's decision not to represent a client on the basis of gender violates the First Amendment. For an article arguing that it does, go here. For more articles, mostly supporting the lawyer’s right to reject clients even if doing so could be considered to be discriminatory, go here and here.
The proposed new rule does not address this issue directly other that by saying in the comment to the proposed rule that the rule does not apply to activities protected by the First Amendment. But since it is not clear that discriminating when choosing client is, in fact, protected by the First Amendment, it is also not clear whether the rule would ban this aspect of the practice of law.
The proposed new comment also states that the new rule does not prevent a lawyer from rejecting a case under Rule 1.16 which allows an attorney to refuse or withdraw from representation. However, again, this seems inconclusive since it is not clear that rejecting someone on the basis of gender would be considered to be valid under the rule that allows a client to reject a client for personal reasons. Interestingly, one way to avoid discipline in a case like this would be for the lawyer to simply lie to the prospective client when explaining why the lawyer rejected the case, thus making sure the reason given falls within the acceptable reasons under Rule 1.16. Yet, I have to think that it would be ironic, to say the least, that by encouraging lawyers not to discriminate, we could be encouraging them to lie so they could do what they believe to be best for them, their practice and their current clients.
Shouldn’t certain types of discriminatory conduct be subject to discipline?
One can make a good argument that engaging in discrimination is wrong in a moral sense. It may even be the wrong way to attempt to support an ideological position (for articles on that point go here and here). Yet, the question is not whether it is wrong. The question is whether it should be considered conduct that should subject a lawyer to discipline. Before Stropnicky, the generally accepted view in the profession was that it wasn’t. Maybe that view changed since then, but I would like to see more evidence of it before making up my mind.
Conclusion
OK. I think that is enough for now. Please let me know what you think. And let the Committee know too. The Committee has requested comments on its latest draft proposal. Written comments will be accepted until March 11, and the committee will hold a public hearing in San Diego on Feb. 7 to discuss the proposal.
In particular, the committee is seeking feedback on whether the new proposed rule should be limited to conduct that occurs “in the course of representing a client” as opposed to “conduct related to the practice of law,” which would cover the operation and management of a firm and thus implicate workplace discrimination or harassment.
According to the Committee, at least 24 U.S. jurisdictions have adopted some form of anti-bias, anti-prejudice and/or anti-harassment rule as part of their lawyer conduct rules. But the rules vary significantly and the Committee is trying to find a good way to compromise all the concerns and interests.
There is no question that manifestations of prejudice, bias and discrimination are always a cause for concern. However, as I have been thinking about the issue, I find myself torn. I understand the interest behind the proposal but I also have some concerns about the proposed rule. I am working on a longer article on this, but while I do so, I thought I would share some of my initial thoughts on the matter.
After I was done writing this, I realized the post came out to be much longer than I expected - and probably rambling too - so let me insert a few bullet points here before you start reading the whole thing:
1. The Model Rules do not address issues related to bias or discrimination in the practice of law, and the current approach to the issue expressed in the comment to Rule 8.4 is actually worse than the Committee believes it to be.
2. Thus, if you think there ought to be a rule on this topic, there certainly is a good argument for enacting one. Yet the question is whether there ought to be a rule to begin with.
3. I am not opposed to enacting a rule, but I am also not convinced that we need one.
4. If we are going to have a rule, the proposed rule is a good start but needs to be adjusted.
5. At the very least, the rule should make it part of the rule (as opposed to the comment) that it won’t apply to conduct or speech protected by the First Amendment.
6. The rule should make clear how it can, or can’t, be applied to the decision to accept or reject clients. Personally, I think the rule should not apply to the client selection process.
Now here are the details:
The current state of the law
Current Model Rule 8.4(d) (and most, if not all, of its state equivalents) consider misconduct to engage in conduct that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice." In addition, paragraph 3 of the comment to Model Rule 8.4 states that “[a] lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. ...”
There are several problems with this comment. First, it suggests there could be discipline on the basis of speech. Note that it talks about manifesting “by words or conduct.” Manifesting means expressing and expressing an idea by words is, by definition, speech. So I have a problem with the suggestion that the state can discipline an attorney for expressing an idea, even if that idea is offensive to some. It seems to me that if the First Amendment stands for something, it stands for the proposition that the state has very limited authority to regulate speech simply because someone might find that speech offensive.
Second, contrary to what the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility says in its memo in support of the Draft Proposal, the comment does not say that expressing bias or prejudice while representing a client is prejudicial to the administration of justice (and thus could subject the lawyer to possible discipline). It only states that if engaging in that conduct is against the administration of justice then the lawyer could be subject to discipline for violating the ban against conduct that is against the administration of justice.
The current comment, thus, suggests that under certain circumstances knowingly manifesting bias or prejudice would not constitute conduct against the administration of justice and, thus, would not be the basis for discipline. For this reason, if one thinks that discriminatory or biased conduct should always be considered to be misconduct, given what the current comment actually states, the argument for a new rule is actually stronger than the one currently advanced by the Committee.
But, putting aside that initial misunderstanding as to what the current comment says, the question remains whether it is a good idea to amend the rule as proposed.
What is the policy behind the proposal?
In support of the proposal, the Committee cites a resolution drafted by members of the Oregon New Lawyers Division which states, among other things, that “[t]here is a need for a cultural shift in understanding the inherent integrity of people regardless of their race, color, national origin, religion, age, sex, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, marital status, or disability, to be captured in the rules of professional conduct.”
I totally agree that there is a need for a cultural shift, but I am still unclear as to why it needs to be captured (or why it would be a good idea to capture it) in the rules of professional conduct.
In response to that question, the resolution continues saying that the need arises “because the Model Rules are supposed to ensure the integrity of the legal profession.”
But is that really the purpose of the rules of professional conduct? According to the Scope section of the Model Rules, the Rules of Professional Conduct “simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law” and the basis for the imposition of discipline when the conduct of a lawyer violates that framework. I have never been particularly fond of arguments for discipline based on a need to protect “the integrity of the profession.” What is “the integrity of the profession” if not a subjective concept based on a value judgment the state seems to want to impose upon all members of the profession? Isn’t it as vague as “the appearance of impropriety” which has been generally abandoned as a standard for evaluating what ought to be considered misconduct?
As has been argued elsewhere, discrimination is a social evil and the Rules of Professional Conduct are not necessarily designed to address social evils; they are yardsticks by which we measure the fitness of lawyers to practice.
Now, one might say that someone who believes in discrimination or who behaves in a discriminatory manner is not fit to practice law. Yet, I don’t think that’s the case. Aside from the much criticized case involving white supremacist Matthew Hale in Illinois, denying someone the right to practice law because they believe (or have expressed that they believe) in discrimination could be interpreted to be a violation of the First Amendment. Also, lawyers are allowed to discriminate in certain aspects of the practice of law (more about that later).
Thus, I am concerned about possible regulation of speech based on a value judgment about whether a certain expression is an affront to the “integrity of the profession.” This was the kind of reasoning used to exclude Matthew Hale by a panel that found that his "publicly displayed views are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit" of the Rules of Professional Conduct” and that “in regulating the conduct of attorneys, certain "fundamental truths" of equality and nondiscrimination "must be preferred over the values found in the First Amendment."
The proposed new rule 8.4 seems to be based on a very similar notion that there is a fundamental value, which can be enforced through the disciplinary process, in equality and nondiscrimination.
Freedom of speech
One concern over adopting “anti-bias” rules is that if the rule is not drafted carefully it may be subject to attack for regulating constitutionally protected speech, even if the state can, and already does, regulate attorneys' speech in other contexts.
Take for example a recent case in New York in which a lawyer was suspended for, among other things, having made “patently offensive racial, ethnic, homophobic, sexist, and other derogatory remarks to attorneys.” The case is Matter of Teague and it is available here.
The opinion does not really explain the context of the statements other than saying they were uttered “to attorneys.” The court suggests that the attorney in question “spewed racist, sexist, homophobic and offensive epithets against other attorneys that any reasonable person, let alone a reasonable attorney, would know are simply unacceptable in public discourse,” but it is not clear, when or where, those epithets were uttered. Again, the decision seems to be based on the notion that certain expressions are inherently unacceptable and, thus, can subject an attorney to discipline.
The court concluded that “Respondent’s conduct should not and will not be tolerated.” This conclusion is fine as to the other “conduct” involved in the case (disruptive conduct in hearings) and maybe for conduct that can be argued to be prejudicial to the administration of justice (as I assume was the case in that case), but not necessarily as to the content of the attorney's speech in all circumstances.
Would it be permissible for the state to discipline a lawyer for expressing bias at a social event? ...during conversation with a stranger at a bar? ... during a political rally? Would it be permissible for a state to discipline an attorney because the attorney is a member of a group that expresses bias against others? ...or a member of a church that expresses bias against women or other religious groups?
Smartly, the drafters of the new proposed rule eliminated the reference to expressions by words (although the new language does not necessarily limit the rule’s application to conduct) and added a new statement in the comment to the rule explaining that the rule does not apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Thus, according to the comment, which is elsewhere described as a guide to the interpretation of the rule, a lawyer could not be disciplined for prejudiced, biased or harassing speech if the speech is "unrelated to the practice of law or protected by the First Amendment."
I like that, but how would we apply this standard to a lawyer who rejects a case because the prospective client is gay and the lawyer says he objects to gays on religious reasons? Isn’t the lawyer engaging in discriminatory conduct? Does this mean that some discriminatory conduct is permitted by the rules? If so, how is that different from the current approach, which says some discriminatory conduct is not prejudicial to the administration of justice?
And then there is the fact that not all jurisdictions adopt the comments. What would happen in such a jurisdiction? Could the use of the word “harass” be interpreted to apply to speech? After all, one can harass someone else by expressing offensive speech. Could the Matthew Hale denial of admission then become support for the notion that there are certain fundamental values, including a value in non discrimination, that could be enforced by the imposition of discipline?
Here is another problem. As currently drafted, the rule says it is professional misconduct to “harass or knowingly discriminate.” Doesn’t this mean that there can be discipline if you unknowingly harass someone? This is a dangerous proposition. What if a lawyer is accused of engaging in “microaggressions,” which have been defined as happening below the level of awareness of well-intentioned members of the dominant culture? Does the fact that the microaggression is expressed with words by definition place it under the protection of the First Amendment and, therefore, outside the reach of the proposed rule? What if the microaggression is not expressed but the result of conduct? Will disciplinary agencies need to go into interpretations of what was meant by a certain conduct or attitude and whether it can be interpreted to be offensive to the complainant?
For an article critical of the concept of microaggressions go here. For an article critical of using microaggressions as the basis for disciplinary actions (in a context other than law) go here.
The Committee’s memo in support of the proposed new rule states that “[t]he terms “harassment” and “discrimination” are defined terms under law; they refer to the adverse, negative consequences of conduct that manifests bias or prejudice.” Yet, the Committee does not state which law, statute or doctrine should be used to define the terms and the definition it provides does not adequately limit what could be a very broad interpretation of the concepts, including the notion of microaggressions.
In contrast, Illinois Rule 8.4(g) holds it is misconduct to violate a federal, state or local statute or ordinance that prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status by conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer. In this way, the rule of professional conduct limits its application to conduct that is determined to be discriminatory by other defined and applicable statutes and standards. This seems to be preferable than to base the determination of what is discriminatory on whether it is offensive to the integrity of the profession. For a discussion of this issue under California law, go here.
Duty to report misconduct?
Moving on... Here is another concern. Under Rule 8.3 attorneys have a duty to report misconduct of other attorneys under certain circumstances. Would attorneys now be subject to discipline if they don’t report another attorney’s offensive conduct? What if the conduct is offensive to another person but not to the attorney who fails to report it? And what if the conduct is part of an expression by words? (Note how much of the problem for me keeps coming back to the issue of the protection of speech vs. conduct and the interaction with the First Amendment. Is the end result that we can impose discipline for discriminatory conduct but have to tolerate discriminatory speech?)
The ABA Journal.com recently asked readers to post whether they had ever heard sexist comments at work. You can see the responses here. How many of these would trigger the proposed rule and, therefore, the duty to report by those who heard the comments? Or, again, is the fact that they were "comments," which by definition is different from "conduct" mean that comments don't count?
Is the proposed rule too broad?
Shouldn’t certain types of discriminatory conduct be subject to discipline? Sure. There are plenty of examples out there of lawyers who have been duly disciplined for harassing and discriminatory conduct. But usually the conduct is also a violation of other regulation or statutes, and there didn’t seem to be a need to create new rules to impose discipline.
The proposed new rule not only creates a specific rule, it uses language that expands on the reach of the current comment. Whereas the current comment to Model Rule 8.4 applies to conduct “in the course of representing a client,” the new rule would apply to “conduct related to the practice of law.”
As the Committee explains in its memo in support of the proposal, there are arguments for and against this change, but it determined that the arguments for the new language is more compelling.
The question for me is whether the new rule, with the new language, would make a difference. It seems like it would, but not necessarily by creating new situations in which discipline would be available. Take for example a case in which a lawyer sexually harasses a law firm colleague. Currently, this situation could result in discipline in one of two ways. First, discipline could be imposed as the result of a finding, after whatever procedure applies, of an actual violation of the law. This would require the person who suffered the harassment to bring a complaint, and for that claim to be resolved through the proper process. In the alternative, the disciplinary agency could impose sanctions based on a finding that the conduct should be deemed to be “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” One might think this is a stretch, but there are plenty of cases out there that have resulted in discipline for conduct based on this standard.
To avoid having to stretch the use of the notion of “the administration of justice,” however, it might not be a bad idea to create a new rule. This also eliminates the dependency on other procedures before discipline can be imposed. As the Committee has said, the fact that legal remedies exist for those who suffer workplace harassment or discrimination at the hands of lawyers isn't reason enough to exclude that behavior from the scope of the proposed rule.
The biggest change the new rule could create in a situation like this one is that the person who was harassed does not even need to complain at all for a claim to be initiated. If the conduct is observed by another lawyer, presumably that lawyer has a duty to report it and a disciplinary action could be initiated based on that observation. Obviously, without the corroboration or cooperation of the person who was harassed the case would be weak, but that is a different issue.
The point here is that the expansion of the language in the proposed new rule could have the effect of bringing more conduct within the application of the rule; but only as long as the conduct is not protected by the First Amendment or exempted by the rule itself. Suppose that a lawyer gets drunk at a firm party and directs homophobic or racial slurs at a co-worker. Would the lawyer be subject to discipline? Probably not, whether under the current state of the law, nor under the new proposed rule.
Are lawyers allowed to discriminate when choosing clients?
I mentioned above that one possible problem with the new rule could be the fact that lawyers are allowed to discriminate in certain aspects of the practice of law. This is particularly true when it comes to selecting clients. It is generally accepted that lawyers are free to reject the representation of prospective clients for any number of reasons. Some firms actually do so based on gender. Take for example this law firm, or this one, for example.
By choosing to represent only men, or women, a firm, by definition is engaged in discrimination. It may be permissible discrimination, but discrimination it is. The question is whether the new rule recognizes a distinction between discrimination that is permissible or whether it would ban the kind of practice engaged in by firms that specialize in representing men or women in divorce cases.
This question reminds me of the debate generated by Stropnicky v. Nathanson, a case in which a Hearing Commissioner for the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ruled that a woman lawyer could not refuse to represent men in divorce actions under the state's public accommodation statute. The lawyer was fined, but she was not subject to discipline. Under the new rule, presumably she would be.
Stropnicky generated a healthy debate on whether the application of a state’s anti-discrimination statute to a lawyer's decision not to represent a client on the basis of gender violates the First Amendment. For an article arguing that it does, go here. For more articles, mostly supporting the lawyer’s right to reject clients even if doing so could be considered to be discriminatory, go here and here.
The proposed new rule does not address this issue directly other that by saying in the comment to the proposed rule that the rule does not apply to activities protected by the First Amendment. But since it is not clear that discriminating when choosing client is, in fact, protected by the First Amendment, it is also not clear whether the rule would ban this aspect of the practice of law.
The proposed new comment also states that the new rule does not prevent a lawyer from rejecting a case under Rule 1.16 which allows an attorney to refuse or withdraw from representation. However, again, this seems inconclusive since it is not clear that rejecting someone on the basis of gender would be considered to be valid under the rule that allows a client to reject a client for personal reasons. Interestingly, one way to avoid discipline in a case like this would be for the lawyer to simply lie to the prospective client when explaining why the lawyer rejected the case, thus making sure the reason given falls within the acceptable reasons under Rule 1.16. Yet, I have to think that it would be ironic, to say the least, that by encouraging lawyers not to discriminate, we could be encouraging them to lie so they could do what they believe to be best for them, their practice and their current clients.
Shouldn’t certain types of discriminatory conduct be subject to discipline?
One can make a good argument that engaging in discrimination is wrong in a moral sense. It may even be the wrong way to attempt to support an ideological position (for articles on that point go here and here). Yet, the question is not whether it is wrong. The question is whether it should be considered conduct that should subject a lawyer to discipline. Before Stropnicky, the generally accepted view in the profession was that it wasn’t. Maybe that view changed since then, but I would like to see more evidence of it before making up my mind.
Conclusion
OK. I think that is enough for now. Please let me know what you think. And let the Committee know too. The Committee has requested comments on its latest draft proposal. Written comments will be accepted until March 11, and the committee will hold a public hearing in San Diego on Feb. 7 to discuss the proposal.
In particular, the committee is seeking feedback on whether the new proposed rule should be limited to conduct that occurs “in the course of representing a client” as opposed to “conduct related to the practice of law,” which would cover the operation and management of a firm and thus implicate workplace discrimination or harassment.
Tuesday, January 12, 2016
Judicial Campaigns and the Appearance of Impropriety
Professor Ron Rotunda's most recent column at Justicia.com is on Judicial Campaigns and the Appearance of Impropriety. Worth a look... Go here. He argues among other things that the notion of the "appearance of impropriety" is inadequate as an expression of a rule. I agree and we are not alone. I have reported before on a number of courts which have rejected the notion at least as a way to determine conflicts of interests. For two relatively recent posts on that subject go here and here.
Monday, January 11, 2016
Utah getting close to allowing non-lawyers to provide some legal services
As I have argued before,
the "hottest" issue in professional responsibility today is the notion
of "innovation" which is shorthand for a discussion on new approaches to
providing legal services. And one of the most important recent
developments on the subject was the approval of a proposal in Washington
state to allow (and to regulate) the provision of limited legal
services
by state certified legal technicians (known as Limited License Legal
Technicians, or LLLTs). I discussed this development here, here and, most recently, here.
Once Washington approved its program at least seven other states—California, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont and Virginia—have created task forces to study the possibility of limited licensing as a partial solution to the so-called “access to justice gap.” But Utah is the only jurisdiction where such a task force, which received its charge from its state supreme court, has finalized a recommendation.
Based on the recommendation, the Utah Supreme Court has given preliminary approval to a program that would authorize “licensed paralegal practitioners” (LPPs) to engage in the practice of law on a limited basis by performing discrete legal tasks in specified practice areas. The Court will now form a committee to make recommendations on numerous unresolved details—including the scope of the services LPPs will be allowed to perform, the practice areas they will be confined to and the regulatory framework for licensing LPPs and overseeing their conduct.
The recommendation urges to the court to authorize LPPs to perform limited tasks in three practice areas: family law, eviction and debt collection within which they would be allowed to provide limited client counseling, help with forms, represent a client in mediated negotiations, explain another party's documents and prepare settlement agreements, among other things.
Interestingly, although not surprisingly, the task force expects there will be significant “opposition from lawyers” which could be one “barrier to establishing a paraprofessional program.” Sixty percent of those responding to a 2015 survey said they disagree with the proposal, with many expressing concerns that the public needs access to qualified counsel, rather than to unqualified counsel in what is a highly complex area of the law which can impact the client significantly for years to come.
For more information, you can check out the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Responsibility, 31 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 760.
Once Washington approved its program at least seven other states—California, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont and Virginia—have created task forces to study the possibility of limited licensing as a partial solution to the so-called “access to justice gap.” But Utah is the only jurisdiction where such a task force, which received its charge from its state supreme court, has finalized a recommendation.
Based on the recommendation, the Utah Supreme Court has given preliminary approval to a program that would authorize “licensed paralegal practitioners” (LPPs) to engage in the practice of law on a limited basis by performing discrete legal tasks in specified practice areas. The Court will now form a committee to make recommendations on numerous unresolved details—including the scope of the services LPPs will be allowed to perform, the practice areas they will be confined to and the regulatory framework for licensing LPPs and overseeing their conduct.
The recommendation urges to the court to authorize LPPs to perform limited tasks in three practice areas: family law, eviction and debt collection within which they would be allowed to provide limited client counseling, help with forms, represent a client in mediated negotiations, explain another party's documents and prepare settlement agreements, among other things.
Interestingly, although not surprisingly, the task force expects there will be significant “opposition from lawyers” which could be one “barrier to establishing a paraprofessional program.” Sixty percent of those responding to a 2015 survey said they disagree with the proposal, with many expressing concerns that the public needs access to qualified counsel, rather than to unqualified counsel in what is a highly complex area of the law which can impact the client significantly for years to come.
For more information, you can check out the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Responsibility, 31 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 760.
Sunday, January 10, 2016
Kansas Supreme Court reaffirms its position that criminal defendant does not have to show actual innocence to support a malpractice claim, but does have to get post conviction relief
The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the question, have held that, in order to support a legal malpractice claim against a lawyer whose negligence arguably causes the defendant to be wrongfully convicted, a criminal defendant has to show the he or she was actually innocent. A few jurisdictions do not impose any requirements on such plaintiffs other than those imposed by the law of torts in any malpractice claim. But there is a compromise position in between these two, and the Supreme Court of Kansas recently reaffirmed its adherence to it.
In a case called Garcia v. Ball, available here, the court reaffirmed its position in an older case stating that the "rule does not require a criminal defendant to prove actual innocence in order to bring a legal malpractice claim against his or her criminal defense attorney.... But the rule does require "the lifting of criminal liability by vacation or reversal of a conviction, regardless of whether the vacation or reversal is compelled by a successful assertion of actual innocence.""
In Garcia, the lower court accepted Garcia's stipulation to violating probation, revoked his probation, and remanded Garcia to the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections to serve his originally imposed prison term. But the journal entry of sentencing erroneously directed that Garcia was subject to postrelease supervision following his probation revocation, which ultimately led to Garcia serving more time in prison than his original sentence. Garcia sued his former lawyer (Ball) and the case was eventually dismissed. On appeal, the court held that Garcia has met the requirement of showing post conviction relief and reversed:
In a case called Garcia v. Ball, available here, the court reaffirmed its position in an older case stating that the "rule does not require a criminal defendant to prove actual innocence in order to bring a legal malpractice claim against his or her criminal defense attorney.... But the rule does require "the lifting of criminal liability by vacation or reversal of a conviction, regardless of whether the vacation or reversal is compelled by a successful assertion of actual innocence.""
In Garcia, the lower court accepted Garcia's stipulation to violating probation, revoked his probation, and remanded Garcia to the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections to serve his originally imposed prison term. But the journal entry of sentencing erroneously directed that Garcia was subject to postrelease supervision following his probation revocation, which ultimately led to Garcia serving more time in prison than his original sentence. Garcia sued his former lawyer (Ball) and the case was eventually dismissed. On appeal, the court held that Garcia has met the requirement of showing post conviction relief and reversed:
Accordingly, Garcia was not required to prove that he was actually innocent of either the crime for which he was illegally sentenced to a postrelease supervision term or the new crime that triggered his imprisonment for violating the unlawfully imposed postrelease supervision. Instead, Garcia was required to obtain post-sentencing relief from the unlawful sentence. That "exoneration" occurred when the district court acknowledged that it had imposed an illegal sentence by entering a nunc pro tunc order, setting aside the illegal postrelease supervision term.
Monday, January 4, 2016
Detailed comment on New York's new rule on temporary admission to practice
Saturday, January 2, 2016
Update on the process to adopt new rules in California
As you may recall, in October 2014 it was reported that the California Supreme Court has decided not to adopt a proposal for new rules of professional conduct after 14 years of work by a rules revision commission after which the process went into disarray. For background and comments on the issues go here, here, here, here, here, here and here.
Now here is the latest as reported by Lawyerist.
Now here is the latest as reported by Lawyerist.
Wednesday, December 30, 2015
New York amends its rules; allows lawyers from other jurisdictions to temporarily practice in New York
The ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Responsibility is reporting that "[l]awyers licensed outside New York are finally allowed to engage in temporary law practice in the Empire State, thanks to a new court rule adopted Dec. 10.
With this long-awaited step, New York became the 47th state to adopt a version of ABA Model Rule 5.5 on multijurisdictional practice. The new temporary practice rule goes into effect Dec. 30, or as soon as certain steps required by New York judiciary law are completed. The New York rule differs from the MJP rules of other states in a couple of ways. Most notably, it allows temporary practice not just by lawyers licensed in other U.S. jurisdictions, but also by lawyers who are authorized to practice law in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. Also, New York's new MJP rule is a rule of attorney admission rather than a rule of professional conduct. This approach enabled MJP to be adopted in New York without getting approval from the presiding justices of the four appellate divisions, as is required for professional conduct rules."
The ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Responsibility has the full story at 31 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 758 (here).
The ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Responsibility has the full story at 31 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 758 (here).
Friday, December 25, 2015
A conversation with LegalZoom's CEO
The Lawyerist has a podcast on LegalZoom with its CEO, John Suh, in which the hosts talk about the nuts and bolts of how LegalZoom builds documents, the role LegalZoom plays in access to justice, its brushes with various states’ ethics boards, the ways LegalZoom partners with lawyers to deliver legal services, which it claims is more effective than LegalZoom or lawyers could do alone and about "why lawyers should stop treating LegalZoom like the bogeyman." Go here to listen to the program/
Sunday, December 13, 2015
Five ethical issues to consider related to litigation financing
There is a lot of literature out there about litigation financing. Here is a short article asking five important questions to consider when asking whether litigation financing is ethical.
May lawyers reveal conflidential information to prevent a client's suicide?
The Virginia State Bar recently addressed the question of whether an attorney can disclose confidential information in order to help prevent a client from committing suicide.
Although Virginia ethics rules don’t specifically address a client’s threat of suicide, a 1984 Virginia ethics opinion said it is not improper for a lawyer to disclose to appropriate mental health authorities a client’s intent to commit suicide. Therefore, according to an update to the Virginia State Bar’s list on frequently asked legal-ethics questions, a lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action when the lawyer reasonably believes a client’s suicide threat is credible, adding that the rules “should be interpreted to allow the lawyer to contact the client’s family, close friends, mental health care providers, or emergency medical services personnel so that an intervention can be made to save the client from harm.” Check out question and answer #26 here.
The Legal Profession blog has more information and some links here.
Although Virginia ethics rules don’t specifically address a client’s threat of suicide, a 1984 Virginia ethics opinion said it is not improper for a lawyer to disclose to appropriate mental health authorities a client’s intent to commit suicide. Therefore, according to an update to the Virginia State Bar’s list on frequently asked legal-ethics questions, a lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action when the lawyer reasonably believes a client’s suicide threat is credible, adding that the rules “should be interpreted to allow the lawyer to contact the client’s family, close friends, mental health care providers, or emergency medical services personnel so that an intervention can be made to save the client from harm.” Check out question and answer #26 here.
The Legal Profession blog has more information and some links here.
On the issues raised by the need to reply to negative reviews
As you probably know, consumers often take to the internet to review products and services. These reviews can be helpful to other consumers considering buying or seeking similar products or services. Sometimes, when the reviews are negative, those who are criticized can and do reply to "defend" themselves. Can a lawyer do the same?
There are law review articles and other literature on this out there. There is no general reason to say a lawyer can't respond to a negative review, but a lawyer clearly has to be careful not to violate the rules of professional conduct when doing so. In particular, lawyers have to be careful not to disclose confidential information when replying to a review, and since the category of confidential information is so broad, it may prove to be very difficult to reply to a review without doing so.
It can be argued that the exception to Rule 1.6 that allows attorneys to disclose confidential information to the extent necessary to respond to a claim filed against them should apply to allow attorneys to defend themselves from attacks on negative reviews, but I think that is a stretch given the current language of the rule. As explained by a recent post in Attorneys for the Profession,
There are law review articles and other literature on this out there. There is no general reason to say a lawyer can't respond to a negative review, but a lawyer clearly has to be careful not to violate the rules of professional conduct when doing so. In particular, lawyers have to be careful not to disclose confidential information when replying to a review, and since the category of confidential information is so broad, it may prove to be very difficult to reply to a review without doing so.
It can be argued that the exception to Rule 1.6 that allows attorneys to disclose confidential information to the extent necessary to respond to a claim filed against them should apply to allow attorneys to defend themselves from attacks on negative reviews, but I think that is a stretch given the current language of the rule. As explained by a recent post in Attorneys for the Profession,
Restrictions on lawyers' ability to respond to criticism do raise some troubling concerns. Negative online reviews by clients remain on the Internet indefinitely and may even dominate an attorney's search engine results for several years, available to anyone, anywhere there is Internet access with a few "clicks." So even though the New York State Bar Ethics Committee concluded in its Opinion 1032 that the exception to RPC 1.6 should not be "interpreted in a manner that could chill…discussion," the reality is that prohibiting attorneys from fully defending against such potentially ruinous online comments does just that, by allowing the disgruntled client's side of the story to go unchallenged. A strong argument can be made that the self-defense exception to Rule 1.6 that exists in every state except California should be extended to allow lawyers to go online to defend themselves to the extent reasonably necessary in order to correct false or misleading reviews without having to fear potential disciplinary consequences. But until such a change is made to a state’s RPCs, or the exception is reinterpreted, lawyers should remember that the rules currently do not permit the use of confidential information in responding [to online criticism]. . .You should read the full post here.
Will lawyers be replaced by robots, part 3
In part because of the on going debate on 'innovation' and new ways to provide legal services, there is an on going discussion on the role of "artificial intelligence" in the practice of law. See here and here for previous posts on the subject. Adding to the discussion, Law Technology Today has a posted a short comment called "The Future of Law Firms: Will AI Replace Young Attorneys and Paralegals?" It is available here.
California's proposal on "classic retainers" and flat fees
As you probably know, California is going through the process of revising it rules of professional conduct. See here and here for recent updates on that. If you are a long time reader of this blog, you may also know that I have often commented on the confused state of the law regarding flat fees. See here, here and here for examples of why I have said that. Much of that confusion relates to the issue of whether fees can be non-refundable.
California's proposal is actually pretty straightforward and, in my opinion, a good approach to the question. It states, in part,
California's proposal is actually pretty straightforward and, in my opinion, a good approach to the question. It states, in part,
(d) A lawyer may make an agreement for, charge, or collect a fee that is denominated as “earned on receipt” or “non-refundable,” or in similar terms, only if the fee is a true retainer and the client agrees in writing after disclosure that the client will not be entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee charged. A true retainer is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to ensure the lawyer’s availability to the client during a specified period or on a specified matter, but not to any extent as compensation for legal services performed or to be performed.
(e) A lawyer may make an agreement for, charge, or collect a flat fee for specified legal services as long as the lawyer performs the agreed upon services. A flat fee is a fee which constitutes complete payment for legal fees to be performed in the future for a fixed sum regardless of the amount of work ultimately involved and which may be paid in whole or in part in advance of the lawyer providing those services.
Section (d) says that a classic retainer can be non-refundable. However, you must remember that the retainer is still subject to the rule that says that all fees must be reasonable. So is it possible that under certain circumstances making the retainer non refundable can make it unreasonable? How about a case where a client agrees to, and pays the retainer, and then decides the next day that he does not want the lawyer any more? Or a case where the client pays the retainer and when he goes to ask the lawyer to provide services, the lawyer is not available? In those cases, it seems to me the client would have a good argument that the lawyer has a duty to refund the retainer because otherwise the non-refundability aspect of it would make it unreasonable. If I am right, then all the rules says is that, in the end, a classic retainer can be non-refundable only as long as making it non-refundable does not make it unreasonable. I think that is pretty much the prevailing view, and I don't have a problem with it.
Section (e) is more controversial. Many, perhaps most, jurisdictions, have held that flat fees (at least when they are paid in advance for work to be performed later) can't be non refundable. However, I have argued that doing so eliminates the advantages of flat fees as alternatives to hourly fees. For that reason I have argued that flat fees should be allowed to be non refundable as long as there is a real possibility that the work to be performed could take longer than originally expected or agreed upon. Section (e) appears to take this approach. As long as the service is completed, the fact that it is completed in less time than expected does not require the lawyer to reimburse the amount of money equivalent to the time saved. Again, however, the fee is subject to the requirement of reasonableness, but in this case the reasonableness refers to the amount charged taking into account the difficulty of the task, how much time it is expected to take to complete, the market rate and other similar factors. this is not the prevailing view, but, again, I don't have a problem with it.
Wednesday, December 9, 2015
Legal Zoom settles case vs North Carolina Bar
The stories regarding whether LegalZoom is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) go back many years. I have posts on this issue on this blog from the very first year I started it. The first story I posted on this is from 2010, here and here, when the company was sued in Missouri for allegedly violating the rules regarding UPL. That claim was eventually settled. See here.
Then in 2011 it was LegalZoom which took the offensive and sued the North Carolina Bar challenging its application of the rules regarding UPL. See here.
Now comes news that LegalZoom's claim against the North Carolina State Bar has been settled. (Forbes). According to the story, under the terms of the settlement the state bar has agreed to support legislation that would clarify the definition of “unauthorized practice of law,” which currently is open to various interpretations and was used by the bar to challenge LegalZoom.
This is becoming one of the most important debates for the profession. The ABA has announced a partnership with Rocket Lawyer (Legal Zoom's competition), and has created a Commission on the Future of Legal Services to study other innovative approaches to providing legal services.
The ABA has been slow to adopt meaningful change to its rules and views on innovation and it is not clear at this point what the recommendations of the Commission will be. Also, the recommendations one similar state commission were not entirely well received (here). But whatever happens, the ongoing and future debate on these issues (usually bundled under the catchphrase (or catch-word, rather) "innovation") will be interesting.
Lawyer Ethics Alert Blog has more on the story here. (10/28/15)
For more on LegalZoom go here, here and here.
UPDATE (12-9-15): In my original post (above) I stated the case was "settled" and referred to the terms of the "settlement." To be accurate, though, the parties agreed to a "consent judgment" in the case, the terms of which are summarized by the North Carolina State Bar here. You can also read the full text of the consent judgment here. One important point not mentioned before is that the consent agreement does not terminate the litigation but merely suspends it for two years or until the legislature approves the proposed legislation to amend the definition of the practice of law. If this is not achieved within two years, the agreement states the parties can resume the litigation. If the parties resume litigation, they will be free to pursue all claims and defenses that were available to them before the Consent Judgment was entered.
Then in 2011 it was LegalZoom which took the offensive and sued the North Carolina Bar challenging its application of the rules regarding UPL. See here.
Now comes news that LegalZoom's claim against the North Carolina State Bar has been settled. (Forbes). According to the story, under the terms of the settlement the state bar has agreed to support legislation that would clarify the definition of “unauthorized practice of law,” which currently is open to various interpretations and was used by the bar to challenge LegalZoom.
This is becoming one of the most important debates for the profession. The ABA has announced a partnership with Rocket Lawyer (Legal Zoom's competition), and has created a Commission on the Future of Legal Services to study other innovative approaches to providing legal services.
The ABA has been slow to adopt meaningful change to its rules and views on innovation and it is not clear at this point what the recommendations of the Commission will be. Also, the recommendations one similar state commission were not entirely well received (here). But whatever happens, the ongoing and future debate on these issues (usually bundled under the catchphrase (or catch-word, rather) "innovation") will be interesting.
Lawyer Ethics Alert Blog has more on the story here. (10/28/15)
For more on LegalZoom go here, here and here.
UPDATE (12-9-15): In my original post (above) I stated the case was "settled" and referred to the terms of the "settlement." To be accurate, though, the parties agreed to a "consent judgment" in the case, the terms of which are summarized by the North Carolina State Bar here. You can also read the full text of the consent judgment here. One important point not mentioned before is that the consent agreement does not terminate the litigation but merely suspends it for two years or until the legislature approves the proposed legislation to amend the definition of the practice of law. If this is not achieved within two years, the agreement states the parties can resume the litigation. If the parties resume litigation, they will be free to pursue all claims and defenses that were available to them before the Consent Judgment was entered.
ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services has issued its final Resolution & Report; did we really need that? does it say anything new?
The ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services has issued its final Resolution and Report: Regulatory Objectives. This Resolution is scheduled for a vote at the February 2016 San Diego ABA Midyear Meeting.
I glanced at the resolution and will have to spend more time thinking about it, but from what I saw at first glance, there is not much that is new here; nor innovative; nor controversial. Who is going to argue that there is an interest in providing more and better access to legal services? We have been saying that for ages. The question is how are we planning to achieve the goal? What are we going to do to improve on the current situation? That is what we need to be discussing; that is what is at the heart of the on going debate (in the academic literature, at least) on the question of "innovation." Yet, this resolution and report doesn't address it. Maybe I expected too much; or maybe I misunderstood the aim of the Commission. Regardless, it seems the discussion of innovation and new approaches to the delivery of legal services will have to wait for another day.
... and while I have your attention, let me take the opportunity for a shameless plug: If you are interested in this subject consider attending the next International Legal Ethics Conference, July 14 to 16 at Fordham University in New York. For more information go here. I will be hosting two panels during the conference and one of them is on the question of innovation and the future of the profession. You can read a description of the panel and about the panelists here.
I glanced at the resolution and will have to spend more time thinking about it, but from what I saw at first glance, there is not much that is new here; nor innovative; nor controversial. Who is going to argue that there is an interest in providing more and better access to legal services? We have been saying that for ages. The question is how are we planning to achieve the goal? What are we going to do to improve on the current situation? That is what we need to be discussing; that is what is at the heart of the on going debate (in the academic literature, at least) on the question of "innovation." Yet, this resolution and report doesn't address it. Maybe I expected too much; or maybe I misunderstood the aim of the Commission. Regardless, it seems the discussion of innovation and new approaches to the delivery of legal services will have to wait for another day.
... and while I have your attention, let me take the opportunity for a shameless plug: If you are interested in this subject consider attending the next International Legal Ethics Conference, July 14 to 16 at Fordham University in New York. For more information go here. I will be hosting two panels during the conference and one of them is on the question of innovation and the future of the profession. You can read a description of the panel and about the panelists here.
Update on the process to revise the rules in California
Here is an update on the tumultuous process to revise the rules of professional conduct in California. (For the background story go to the California label and scroll down for multiple posts.)
Tuesday, December 8, 2015
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit on the validity of a contingency fee agreement
Last month (on Nov. 5), the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit issued a short, but interesting opinion on whether a certain contingency fee agreement was reasonable. The case is called Goesel v. Boley International Ltd., Westlaw cite: 2015 WL 6774211.
The facts of the case were as follows: A five year-old boy was injured when playing with a toy and his parents retained a law firm to sue on Cole’s behalf. The agreement between the parents and the firm provided that the firm's fees would be one-third of any gross settlement or judgment, and that the clients would be responsible for litigation expenses. In the event of no recovery, the clients would not be responsible for either expenses or fees. After four years of litigation, the case was settled for $687,500. Under the retainer agreement, the firm’s one-third of the gross settlement amount was $229,166.67 and the litigation expenses totaled $172,949.19. This meant the clients would recover about $288,000 or 42% of the total amount of the settlement. Because the injured party a minor at the time of the litigation, the federal court’s local rules required court approval before the settlement could be finalized. At a hearing on the settlement, the district judge launched sua sponte into his objections to a contingent-fee arrangement. Holding that the amount of recovery clients received was inadequate, the judge modified the fee structure, deducting expenses prior to calculating the one-third fee. The law firm appealed.
On appeal, the court held that the fee agreement was reasonable because it did not exceed the prevailing market rate, nor did it defeat the public policy of protecting the interests of minors in litigation. In fact, the court noted that the duty to protect minors is consistent with the policy of promoting access to the courts through reasonable contingent fee arrangements. The court, therefore, reversed the district court’s decision and ordered the original fee arrangement be reinstated.
This was the correct decision. First, it should be noted that the court focused its analysis on the reasonableness of the agreement and not on the fee (or more specifically on the amount recovered by the firm). This is an important distinction. What defines a contingency agreement is the fact that there is a level of uncertainty as to the result of the case, and because of that it is possible that the case could end up generating less value than expected. Also, the fact that the client is responsible for the expenses of the case in addition to the fee earned is not only the prevailing practice, it is also reasonable. Remember that during the litigation, the firm is advancing these costs. If the firm was forced to recover both fees and expenses out of the amount obtained by using the percentange agreed upon to determine fees, there would come a time when the firm could be losing money on the case, which will result in firms not taking certain cases and, therefore, less access to justice for clients. This approach was unsuccessfully attempted as a form of tort reform in Florida.
There is however, one aspect of the agreement that should also be examined. The rules require that a firm proposing a contingency fee agreement explain its consequences and alternatives. This is so precisely to make make that attorneys explain the possibility that the firm may end up recovering a higher amount than the client in the end, as happened in this case. The client must give valid, informed consent, which means the client must freely agree to the fee arrangement with an understanding of this possibility. Presumably this happened in this case, after all it was not the client who objected to the agreement but the trial judge on his own.
The facts of the case were as follows: A five year-old boy was injured when playing with a toy and his parents retained a law firm to sue on Cole’s behalf. The agreement between the parents and the firm provided that the firm's fees would be one-third of any gross settlement or judgment, and that the clients would be responsible for litigation expenses. In the event of no recovery, the clients would not be responsible for either expenses or fees. After four years of litigation, the case was settled for $687,500. Under the retainer agreement, the firm’s one-third of the gross settlement amount was $229,166.67 and the litigation expenses totaled $172,949.19. This meant the clients would recover about $288,000 or 42% of the total amount of the settlement. Because the injured party a minor at the time of the litigation, the federal court’s local rules required court approval before the settlement could be finalized. At a hearing on the settlement, the district judge launched sua sponte into his objections to a contingent-fee arrangement. Holding that the amount of recovery clients received was inadequate, the judge modified the fee structure, deducting expenses prior to calculating the one-third fee. The law firm appealed.
On appeal, the court held that the fee agreement was reasonable because it did not exceed the prevailing market rate, nor did it defeat the public policy of protecting the interests of minors in litigation. In fact, the court noted that the duty to protect minors is consistent with the policy of promoting access to the courts through reasonable contingent fee arrangements. The court, therefore, reversed the district court’s decision and ordered the original fee arrangement be reinstated.
This was the correct decision. First, it should be noted that the court focused its analysis on the reasonableness of the agreement and not on the fee (or more specifically on the amount recovered by the firm). This is an important distinction. What defines a contingency agreement is the fact that there is a level of uncertainty as to the result of the case, and because of that it is possible that the case could end up generating less value than expected. Also, the fact that the client is responsible for the expenses of the case in addition to the fee earned is not only the prevailing practice, it is also reasonable. Remember that during the litigation, the firm is advancing these costs. If the firm was forced to recover both fees and expenses out of the amount obtained by using the percentange agreed upon to determine fees, there would come a time when the firm could be losing money on the case, which will result in firms not taking certain cases and, therefore, less access to justice for clients. This approach was unsuccessfully attempted as a form of tort reform in Florida.
There is however, one aspect of the agreement that should also be examined. The rules require that a firm proposing a contingency fee agreement explain its consequences and alternatives. This is so precisely to make make that attorneys explain the possibility that the firm may end up recovering a higher amount than the client in the end, as happened in this case. The client must give valid, informed consent, which means the client must freely agree to the fee arrangement with an understanding of this possibility. Presumably this happened in this case, after all it was not the client who objected to the agreement but the trial judge on his own.
Monday, December 7, 2015
Excellent post on the proper and improper conduct during depositions
Over at Litigation & Trial, Max Kennerly has published an excellent short post on proper and improper conduct of lawyers when making objections during depositions.
Thursday, December 3, 2015
Do prosecutors have too much power?
Last month, Northwestern University Law School hosted a debate on the topic of whether prosecutors have too much power. The debate featured two speakers in favor of the proposition that prosecutors do indeed have too much power and two speakers against the proposition. The speakers for the proposition were Paul Butler, a former federal prosecutor and currently a professor at Georgetown Law School and Nancy Gertner, a former federal judge and now a lecturer at Harvard Law School. The speakers arguing that prosecutors do not have too much power were David Hoffman, former federal prosecutor and partner at Sidley, Austin and Reid Schar, also a former federal prosecutor and now a partner at Jenner & Block.
The debate was organized by a group called "Intelligence Squared" (or "lQ2") which has its own website with lots of useful information on the topic, the panelists and links to the both video and audio versions of the full debate. Unfortunately, I can't embed the video here, but you can watch it here.
I thought the program was a bit too long, but other than that it was very interesting. They actually have the audience vote on which side "won" the debate and the results are presented at the end. I won't spoil it for you, but even if you don't watch the full show, fast forward to the end to see the results.
Check out the IQ2 website for upcoming debates and mark your calendar.
The debate was organized by a group called "Intelligence Squared" (or "lQ2") which has its own website with lots of useful information on the topic, the panelists and links to the both video and audio versions of the full debate. Unfortunately, I can't embed the video here, but you can watch it here.
I thought the program was a bit too long, but other than that it was very interesting. They actually have the audience vote on which side "won" the debate and the results are presented at the end. I won't spoil it for you, but even if you don't watch the full show, fast forward to the end to see the results.
Check out the IQ2 website for upcoming debates and mark your calendar.
Nearly all members of the Washington Practice of Law Board resign accusing the Washington State Bar Association of systematically undermining the Board's mission
As I have argued before, the "hottest" issue in professional responsibility today is the notion of "innovation" which is shorthand for a discussion on new approaches to providing legal services. And one of the most important recent developments on the subject was the approval of a proposal in Washington state to allow (and to regulate) the provision of limited legal services
by state certified legal technicians (known as Limited License Legal
Technicians, or LLLTs). I discussed this development here and here.
By taking this approach, Washington state became the leader in the discussion of innovative ways to provide access to legal representation. Yet, it appears this came at a cost, and that things are not running as smoothly as I thought.
Last month, nearly all members of the Washington Practice of Law Board resigned accusing the Washington State Bar Association of systematically undermining the Board's mission. The resigning members sent a letter to the Washington Supreme Court detailing their concerns in which they state that "the Washington State Bar Association has a long record of opposing efforts that threaten to undermine its monopoly on the delivery of legal services" including the fact that "[t]he Washington State Bar Association opposed the Limited License Legal Technician Rule..." You can read the full letter here. It ends by stating that "[t]he treatment of the Practice of Law Board over the last three years is a textbook study on how to discourage and disempower a board comprised of volunteers ..."
The Washington State Bar Association has replied that the letter contains “significant misinterpretations and misunderstandings” and that “[a]ccess to justice and the protection of the public are unwavering commitments shared by the Washington Supreme Court and the Washington State Bar Association.” Lawyerist and the ABA Journal have the story here and here.
The assertion that the Bar Association has tried "to protect its monopoly on the delivery of legal services" is not surprising in the sense that that has always been part of the debate on issues of innovation. A lot of the recent discussion on innovation deals with opening the doors to the market of legal services to non-lawyers and it is not uncommon to hear the accusation that lawyers try to keep the doors closed in order to protect their control on the market.
I don't have any information to know whether this accusation is true or accurate when it comes to the Washington Bar Association, but it is a common argument with the larger debate on how to make legal services more accessible, more affordable though innovation.
As you probably know, the ABA has created a Commission on the Future of Legal Services to study these issues.
By taking this approach, Washington state became the leader in the discussion of innovative ways to provide access to legal representation. Yet, it appears this came at a cost, and that things are not running as smoothly as I thought.
Last month, nearly all members of the Washington Practice of Law Board resigned accusing the Washington State Bar Association of systematically undermining the Board's mission. The resigning members sent a letter to the Washington Supreme Court detailing their concerns in which they state that "the Washington State Bar Association has a long record of opposing efforts that threaten to undermine its monopoly on the delivery of legal services" including the fact that "[t]he Washington State Bar Association opposed the Limited License Legal Technician Rule..." You can read the full letter here. It ends by stating that "[t]he treatment of the Practice of Law Board over the last three years is a textbook study on how to discourage and disempower a board comprised of volunteers ..."
The Washington State Bar Association has replied that the letter contains “significant misinterpretations and misunderstandings” and that “[a]ccess to justice and the protection of the public are unwavering commitments shared by the Washington Supreme Court and the Washington State Bar Association.” Lawyerist and the ABA Journal have the story here and here.
The assertion that the Bar Association has tried "to protect its monopoly on the delivery of legal services" is not surprising in the sense that that has always been part of the debate on issues of innovation. A lot of the recent discussion on innovation deals with opening the doors to the market of legal services to non-lawyers and it is not uncommon to hear the accusation that lawyers try to keep the doors closed in order to protect their control on the market.
I don't have any information to know whether this accusation is true or accurate when it comes to the Washington Bar Association, but it is a common argument with the larger debate on how to make legal services more accessible, more affordable though innovation.
As you probably know, the ABA has created a Commission on the Future of Legal Services to study these issues.
ABA files brief urging Supreme Court to review case that the ABA contends threatens the attorney work product doctrine
The ABA Journal is reporting that the ABA has filed a brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to review a decision favoring the Federal Trade Commission in its battle to obtain attorney
documents regarding a drug company’s settlement agreement with a generic
manufacturer, arguing that the appellate decision “opens the floodgates” to disclosure of
attorney work product in government investigations. The ABA's
arguments are summarized in a press release available here. The full brief is available here.
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