On the duty to inform another party of the fact that the other party inadvertently disclosed documents... and more

 Suppose Lawyer A is in litigation and, in response to a request for documents, opposing counsel (Lawyer B) sends a link to a file stored in a service like Dropbox.*  When Lawyer A opens the file using the link, he or she discovers the link provides access to B's client's documents which were not expected to be disclosed and are likely to be considered confidential.

This is what happened in a recent case in New York called Pursuit Credit Special Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Krunchcash, LLC (May 30, 2024), in which the lower court determined that Lawyer A was required to notify Lawyer B that the link contained folders that "counsel knew or should have known were confidential or privileged."  The court imposed a sanction on defendants and their counsel for accessing and downloading the folders from Dropbox.

The order was affirmed in an opinion (available here) that is about seven sentences long.  It cites, among other things, NY's rule 4.4(b) which is based on the equivalent Model Rule which states that "[a] lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender."  

So, going back to our initial question:  in those circumstances, Lawyer A had a duty to inform Lawyer B that Lawyer B had inadvertently disclosed documents.  That much is clear.  But nothing else is, and the incident raises a number of interesting question not addressed by the court.

First of all, why does the court refer to the documents as privileged?  The court refers to the documents in question as "corporate files."  What were these documents?  If they were corporate records that the client gave the lawyer to store, there is no reason to believe that they are protected by the attorney-client privilege, so calling them so would be a mistake.  But I am willing to proceed on the assumption that even if not privileged, they could be considered confidential.

Next, in addition to the duty to inform the other side of their mistake, did Lawyer A have a duty to delete the link immediately or could Lawyer A have looked at the documents to confirm they were privileged before doing anything else?  The rule does not address that, and the comment to the Model Rule explicitly states that the rule does attempt to decide whether the lawyer who receives the information has a duty to return (or in this case delete) the document (or link to it). 

The court's opinion suggests that the lawyer had a duty "to sequester the inadvertently disclosed files" (which I guess means the lawyer could keep them but not look at them) but the court does not cite anything in support of this suggestion.

And then there are the questions related to the conduct of the lawyer who sent the link to begin with, which the court does not discuss.  It can be argued that this lawyer violated their duty of confidentiality and their duty of competence by disclosing protected information by mistake.  Could the lawyer be subject to discipline for this?  In theory, Yes; absolutely.  But. as you know, the reality is that an isolated act of negligence will not likely lead to discipline.  

Could the lawyer be liable in tort for negligence?  Again, in theory yes since the conduct is clearly a breach of duty, but whether there is an actionable cause of action depends on whether the conduct caused an injury and it does not sound that that was the case in this instance.  Lucky for the lawyer!

 I am willing to bet that the ABA has issued an ethics opinion exploring some of the issues that arise out of a situation like this and the application of a rule like Model Rule 4.4(b) but I have not searched for it.

________________

* If you don't know what Dropbox is, this post is for you because you may be in violation of the rule regarding competence since competence requires you to at least "keep abreast of . . . the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology" and Dropbox is pretty old technology.

How not to practice law: when caught, try to alter the evidence in your computer

 April 27. 2024

As reported in Above the Law:  Confronted with an ethics investigation zeroing in on a number of different types of conduct that justified discipline, a lawyer in New Hampshire apparently thought he could get out of his troubles by destroying or altering evidence stored in his computer.  He could not; and got disbarred.  

Above the Law has the full story here. 

UPDATE 5/1/2024:  The ABA Journal has the story here.

How will generative AI affect digital investigations and e-discovery?

 How will generative AI affect digital investigations and e-discovery?  The ABA Journal has an answer here.

How not to practice law: invent your own rules of evidence, then try to get your own made up evidence admitted under them

Here is an interesting story about a lawyer who was recently fined over $250,000 for trying to support a claim with a fake newspaper article.  According to the story, he sought to enter the news article into the record for “demonstrative purposes.”

Now, stop!  That's not how the rules of evidence work.  If the lawyer was trying to get a newspaper article admitted, it must have been to prove the fact that the article was in fact published -- which is not likely to happen because the other side would rather concede the point in order to avoid having the jury get access to the article so they can read it -- OR to prove what the article actually said, which would be inadmissible hearsay unless one of the exceptions applied.

So what does it mean to admit an article "for demonstrative purposes"?  Well, apparently, it meant that the lawyer wanted to "prove" what could have been written in some other alternative universe in which the news was what he wanted them to be -- because the article was a fake ...  in which case the proof should be inadmissible as being fabricated or, at best, speculation.

Any way you look at it, what the lawyer tried to do did not make sense and could be interpreted as an attempt to mislead the court or the jury.  

And then, as a bonus, the lawyer didn’t show up for the sanctions hearing.  

You can read the story (with links) here.

Court imposes sanctions for instructing client not to answer questions during deposition

 Long time readers of this blog have heard (or have read, rather) me complain often that courts do not do enough to discourage misconduct during discovery in civil trials.  But every now and then I am happy to report a case that comes along and shows some judges are doing their part.  Today is such a day.  The Legal Profession blog is reporting on a case out of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in which the judge reprimanded a lawyer for wrongfully instructing a client to refuse to answer questions during a deposition -- a practice that is not uncommon but that often goes unchallenged allowing lawyers to get away with it.  I am glad to see that did not happen in this case.  You can read more about it here.

Is it ethical to advise clients to delete content from social media?

 It depends.  The San Diego County Bar Association explains here.

Lawyer fined nearly $20,000 for obnoxious conduct in violation of rules of procedure during deposition

 I often complain that judges do not do enough to discourage misconduct during discovery, so today I am happy to report that at least one judge is doing her part.  

As reported in the ABA Journal (here), last month federal judge U.S. District Judge Stephanie L. Haines of the Western District of Pennsylvania sanctioned a lawyer imposed a sanction of nearly $20,000 for his conduct during four depositions last year.  The only question I have is why did it take a year for the judge to impose the sanctions, but I guess I'll let that one go for now.  According to the story, the lawyer was fired from his firm soon after the fourth deposition.

You can read the opinion here.  

New ABA Formal Opinion on witness preparation -- UPDATED

About two weeks ago, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a new Formal Ethics Opinion (No. 508) on the ethics of witness preparation.  Its abstract reads: 

A lawyer’s role in preparing a witness to testify and providing testimonial guidance is not only an accepted professional function; it is considered an essential tactical component of a lawyer’s advocacy in a matter in which a client or witness will provide testimony. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct governing the client-lawyer relationship and a lawyer’s duties as an advisor, the failure adequately to prepare a witness would in many situations be classified as an ethical violation. But, in some witness-preparation situations, a lawyer clearly steps over the line of what is ethically permissible. Counseling a witness to give false testimony or assisting a witness in offering false testimony, for example, is a violation of at least Model Rule 3.4(b). The task of delineating what is necessary and proper and what is ethically prohibited during witness preparation has become more urgent with the advent of commonly used remote technologies, some of which can be used to surreptitiously “coach” witnesses in new and ethically problematic ways.

You can read the full opinion here. You can read more about it over at Ethical Grounds.

UPDATE 9-17-23:   Lawyer Ethics Alert Blog has a comment on the Opinion here.

UPDATE 10-5-23:  The Law for Lawyers Today has a comment here.

UPDATE 11-4-23:  The Louisiana Legal Ethics Blog has a comment here.

Rudy, that's not how anything works, Part III: Giuliani found liable for defamation by default

A few days ago, I posted a story questioning why Rudy Giuliani would concede the main elements of a cause of action for defamation he had been fighting (based on his comments about two election workers).  Giuliani -- or perhaps, more accurately, the lawyer representing him -- apparently thought that it was a good tactic in order to avoid complying with a discovery request, but that made no sense.  My original comment explaining why the tactic was likely to fail is here.  

As I predicted, the tactic not only failed, it backfired spectacularly.  See here.  First it resulted in an order to explain his argument and eventually in a finding of liability by default.

Maybe Giuliani and his lawyer did not realize that what they did amounted to conceding the main elements of the cause of action and for that reason, and because of the fact that they did not comply with discovery, the court has found Giuliani liable by default.   

Now that default judgment has been imposed, the case will move to trial on the question of the value of the injury, ie, on the damages issue alone.  And if you have been paying attention to the story in the news and have watched some of the testimony by the plaintiffs, you know it is fair to say that the value will likely be high.  Plus, Giuliani will have to pay attorneys' fees to the plaintiff's lawyers and more in sanctions.

Giuliani is in real trouble.  He is reportedly in dire financial trouble and a huge verdict against him in this case will cause him a lot of distress.  He has been trying to find funding for his legal bills, which include pending disbarment proceedings in New York and Washington DC, the indictment in Georgia, and at least one other defamation case.  Reportedly, Trump is not contributing to his defense fund and Giuliani has put up his NY condo up for sale and is hosting events in attempts to raise funds.  (Trump apparently agreed to appear in one of them, although I won't be surprised if he makes the appearance all about himself and ends up trying to get contributions for his legal defense fund rather than for Giuliani, but that's another story for another day.)

You can read the court's opinion here.  You can find reports and commentary on the default judgment against Giuliani in the following:

Courthouse News Service

The Legal Profession Blog

NPR

The Guardian

Above the Law

NPR audio

Jurist

MSNBC

Rudy, I told you that's not how anything works! -- UPDATED

 Last Friday I posted a story about how Rudy Giuliani attempted to prevent having to comply with discovery in a defamation case by conceding all the elements of the cause of action against him and, at the same time, trying to raise defenses in the case.  And, after explaining the situation I concluded "Unfortunately for Giuliani, that’s not how anything works."  My original story is here.

I fully expected Giuliani's tactic to be rejected and that is just what happened.  Reportedly, the judge overseeing the case has given Giuliani the following options.  He can:

1.  submit a new stipulation conceding liability to the claims “all factual allegations ... as to his liability for plaintiffs’ defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy claims, and his liability as to plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages” and that a default judgment as to his liability is appropriate, or

2.  explain why he is declining to submit such a stipulation by clarifying “what precisely his original stipulation conceded regarding the plaintiffs’ factual allegations and legal claims.”

Should Giuliani fail to choose one or two, the judge will convene a hearing (on August 15) to determine how, if at all, he has complied with her prior order to search and produce all materials responsive to the plaintiffs' discovery requests. 

Stay tuned!

MSNBC has coverage here.  TechDirt has a comment here.

UPDATE: 8-19-23:  Courthouse News Service reports (here) that "The judge in the Smartmatic suit ordered Giuliani to complete discovery production in two weeks, by August 30, or risk an order to a judgment of the company's legal fees arising from the particular motion for an order to show cause."

UPDATE: 9/3/23:  The Court has now entered a judgment by default against Giuliani and ordered him to pay attorneys' fees and other sanctions.  The case will now proceed to trial on the question of damages only which is likely to result in a very high verdict for the plaintiffs.  Go here for my post on this new development.

Why did Rudy Giuliani concede that he made false and defamatory statements about the plaintiffs in a defamation case, thus conceding the elements of the claim?! -- UPDATED

 Last Tuesday Rudy Giuliani filed a two-page stipulation in a long-running defamation lawsuit by two Georgia election workers stating that he “does not contest” that his statements about the plaintiffs were “false” and “carry meaning that is defamatory.”  According to the reporting, Giuliani’s attorney added that Giuliani was not in fact “admitting” to the plaintiffs’ allegations against him but making a decision to stop contesting them, which he says should end the plaintiffs’ effort to seek further factual evidence – emails, text messages and other communications – from Giuliani.

Unfortunately for Giuliani, that’s not how anything works.

First of all, trying to make a distinction between conceding the allegations and not contesting them is nonsense.  You can’t have it both ways.  In the document, Giuliani conceded that he made the statements alleged in the complaint, that the statements were false and that they were defamatory per se.  That means he conceded all the elements of the cause of action. Period, end of story.  All Giuliani has left after that is arguing affirmative defenses.  And which ones are there?  I don’t see any.  

He apparently claims that either the statements were statements of opinion or that they were constitutionally protected.  Both arguments are wrong.  

Once he admits that the statements he made were “false” he has admitted they were not opinions.  By definition opinions can’t be true or false – that’s what distinguishes them from statements of fact.  But Giuliani has conceded they were statements of fact.  So that argument is out - he defeated it himself!  

The other possible argument – that the statements were constitutionally protected, is also flawed.  First, the notion of defamation is based on the doctrine that not all speech is protected and that if it is not protected, it can result in possible liability.  That’s what defamation law is all about.  So the question becomes whether the plaintiff can meet the standard needed to show that the speech is not protected and, therefore, should subject the defendant to liability.

On that, the doctrine has created different standards for different categories of plaintiffs.  If the plaintiff is a public official or a public figure, the plaintiff has to meet a higher standard because speech about them is more protected.  But the plaintiffs in this case were neither.  They were private persons performing a volunteer job as election officials.  I could be wrong about this, but I don’t think they were elected officials for that job, and they were not known celebrities before the elections and before Giuliani and others started accusing them of misconduct.  If I am correct in those assumptions, the plaintiffs in this case do not have to show actual malice on the part of the defendant and will have an easier time defeating the argument that the statements were constitutionally protected.   

Second, Giuliani can’t just say that he wants to end discovery because he does not want to disclose more information.  Discovery exists to allow the parties access to information and, as everyone knows, discovery is not limited to evidence that can be used at trial.  You can use discovery to get access to evidence that will likely lead to evidence that can be used at trial.  In this case, the plaintiffs may want to use discovery to determine if there are other potential defendants they can go after or to discover support for a claim for punitive damages, for example.

The fact Giuliani says he is conceding the elements of the claim to end the plaintiffs’ effort to seek further factual evidence just makes me wonder what he has that wants to hide so badly. 

And, further, defamation was not the only claim in this case.  The plaintiffs’ also sued for emotional distress which is a separate cause of action and they should have the right to continue discovery in order to get evidence related to that claim, which should include the evidence that Giuliani apparently does not want them to get access to.

For these reasons, it seems to me the decision to concede the elements of the defamation cause of action was not a very smart one.  It defeats one of his defenses, makes it easier for the plaintiffs to support their claim and should not stop discovery.

Finally, as an aside, I also can't imagine that publicly admitting that he lied in a way that caused so much injury to private individuals is going to help Giuliani's chances to avoid discipline in the various disciplinary proceedings he is facing.

For coverage of Giuliani's confession see Politico, NPR, MSNBC, The Guardian, The Hill, The Conversation and Above the Law.

UPDATE 8/9/23:  As expected, the judge did not buy it.  See here.

UPDATE: 9/3/23:  The Court has now entered a judgment by default against Giuliani and ordered him to pay attorneys' fees and other sanctions.  The case will now proceed to trial on the question of damages only which is likely to result in a very high verdict for the plaintiffs.  Go here for my post on this new development.

Judge suspends law license of lawyer for Alex Jones following Sandy Hook document leaks

 A lawyer for conspiracy theorist Alex Jones has been suspended from practicing law in Connecticut for six months for improperly giving Jones' attorneys in Texas confidential documents, including the medical records of relatives of victims of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting.

“We cannot expect our system of justice or our attorneys to be perfect, but we can expect fundamental fairness and decency,” the judge wrote. “There was no fairness or decency in the treatment of the plaintiffs' most sensitive and personal information, and no excuse for the respondent's (Pattis') misconduct.”

Pattis said Friday in a text message that he plans to appeal the discipline and seek a stay of the punishment while he challenges it.

You can follow the story her:

Courthouse News Service

CNN

Above the Law 

How not to practice law: tell your client to burn the evidence

 In our latest entry in the "how not to practice law" series, we have a quick practice tip:  don't tell your clients to burn evidence.  Here is the full story.

How not to practice law: Text your client how to answer questions during a deposition, then try to cover it up by claiming incompetence -- UPDATED

November 28, 2021

The Legal Profession Blog recently published a summary of a decision in Florida suspending a lawyer for 91 days for texting a client during a deposition (that was being taken through Zoom).  See here.  Interestingly, the lawyer taking the deposition corroborated the texts when the lawyer who has sent them, sent them to the other lawyer by mistake.... So, add lack of competence regarding technology to the list of examples of misconduct in the case.

Lawyer Ethics Alert Blog has more on the story here.

UPDATE 3/13/22:  Legal Ethics Lawyer published a comment on the case here.

Podcast on civility in the practice of law

The podcast Reimagining Law dedicated a recent episode to discussing the difference between being a client advocate and overly aggressive, how aggressive behavior impacts legal outcomes and the bottom line, and how the Illinois disciplinary authority is addressing acts of incivility that don’t rise to the level of discipline or an ethical violation.  

Some of the topics covered include:  What is the difference between being a zealous advocate for your clients and being overly aggressive?  How can aggressive behavior impact the bottom line or case outcomes?  Are there issues related to incivility transactional matters for lawyers?  How do clients respond to overly aggressive attorneys?  How do judges respond to such attorneys? What happens when an act or the behavior of an attorney doesn’t quite reach the level of an ethical violation?   You can watch the episode below by clicking the "play button" or you can go to YouTube here.

Reinventing Witness Preparation

Litigation Radio has a posted a podcast on witness preparation (sponsored by the ABA section on litigation).  You can listen to the program by clicking on the play button below or by going here.  Here is the description of the program: "Many trial lawyers believe that the less their client says to opposing counsel the better… but is that really true? Kenneth Berman, author of ‘Reinventing Witness Preparation’, joins Dave for a deep dive conversation on how you and your client can take control the narrative even during a line of deceptive questioning. Teaching your client how to answer clearly and completely can be the salvation of your case. Tune in to hear all about it."

Can a lawyer pay a non-expert witness for time spent testifying at a deposition or a trial, preparing for such testimony, and other related costs?

Can a lawyer pay a non-expert witness for time spent testifying at a deposition or a trial, preparing for such testimony, and other related costs?   Brian Faughnan explains the answer here.

Judge sanctions lawyer and client $150K, citing ‘mountain of evasiveness’ and ‘outright lies’

 Long time readers of this blog know that I often complain that judges do not do enough to sanction attorneys who misbehave during the process of discovery in litigation.  So, it is refreshing to see a story that proves me wrong.  The ABA Journal is reporting that a Texas judge has ordered a Houston-area lawyer and his client to be jointly sanctioned $150,000 for the client’s “outright lies” in litigation and “a mountain of evasiveness” in discovery.  Go here for the story.

Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Pretrial Practices Releases Final Report on Criminal Justice System

The Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Pretrial Practices has released its final report concerning pretrial reform in the Illinois criminal justice system.  For more information go here.  You can read the report here.  For the preliminary report and other sources of information go here.

Civility and courtesy in times of crisis

Statement by the Los Angeles County Bar Association’s Professional Responsibility and Ethics Committee:

In light of the unprecedented risks associated with the novel Coronavirus, we urge all lawyers to liberally exercise every professional courtesy and/or discretional authority vested in them to avoid placing parties, counsel, witnesses, judges or court personnel under undue or avoidable stresses, or health risk.

Accordingly, we remind lawyers that the Guidelines for Civility in Litigation (LASC Local Rules, Appendix 3A) require that lawyers grant reasonable requests for extensions and other accommodations.

Given the current circumstances, attorneys should be prepared to agree to reasonable extensions and continuances as may be necessary or advisable to avoid in-person meetings, hearings or deposition obligations. Consistent with California Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a), lawyers should also consult with their clients to seek authorization to extend such extensions or to stipulate to continuances in instances where the clients’ authorization or consent may be required.

While we expect further guidance from the court system will be forthcoming, lawyers must do their best to help mitigate stress and health risk to litigants, counsel and court personnel. Any sharp practices that increase risk or which seek to take advantage of the current health crisis must be avoided in every instance.