Showing posts with label Pro bono. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pro bono. Show all posts

Saturday, August 9, 2025

Hawaii Opens Public Defender Program To Out-Of-State Lawyers

 In a unique move, to deal with the dire need for public defense lawyers, Hawaii has announced a new pilot program to allow out of state lawyers (not licensed in Hawaii) to work in Hawaii public defender’s office, the Hawaii attorney general’s office or county prosecution offices.  To apply for limited admissions to practice in one of those offices, lawyers must have an active license from another state, must have graduated from an ABA accredited law school and must be in good standing. The two year program starts next week, on August 14.

For more information go to the ABA Journal or Above the Law.

Sunday, May 18, 2025

New article on SSRN

Professor Stacie Strong recently posted an article on SSRN which may be of interest to some of you.  It is called Pro Bono Publico Versus Pro Bono Presidential. Its abstract reads 

In March and April 2025, the Trump administration issued a series of executive orders directed at various law firms that had represented clients or undertaken actions with which the president disagreed. Those executive orders imposed various sanctions capable of destroying the firms financially. The administration also threatened a number of other law firms with similar types of executive orders.

While a few law firms chose to challenge the executive orders in court, the majority of firms targeted by the president entered into informal settlement agreements whereby the firms promised to provide between $40 million and $125 million worth of free “pro bono legal services” to causes supported by the president. In return, the president either revoked any sanction-containing executive orders or withheld from issuing such orders.

This Essay considers the propriety of these pro bono agreements from several perspectives. First, this Essay considers the voluntary nature of pro bono and examines the propriety of the executive branch coercing private lawyers to accede to particular pro bono obligations. Second, this Essay discusses the nature of pro bono activities as a means of assisting indigent individuals and considers whether presidential efforts to direct how private law firms fulfill their pro bono obligations constitute an improper privatization of the executive branch’s policy goals, particularly given presidential cuts to and curtailment of conventional public means of fulfilling those policy goals. Third, this Essay considers whether and to what extent the executive orders and settlement agreements discussed herein violate hard or soft principles of international law. The Essay concludes with brief suggestions about how to proceed going forward.

Sunday, November 5, 2023

Illinois doubles its compensation for lawyers appointed to represent indigent parties

Citing its commitment to improving access to justice for all and especially indigent parties, the Illinois Supreme Court announced last week an amendment to Supreme Court Rule 299 regarding compensation for attorneys appointed to represent indigent parties. Amended Rule 299 doubles compensation for an attorney appointed by a court to represent an indigent party to $150 per hour (from its previous minimum of $75 per hour) and $150 per hour for time reasonably expended out of court (from its previous minimum of $50 per hour).  More on the story here, here and here.

Sunday, August 9, 2020

ABA adopts amendment to Model Rule 1.8(e) to allow financial assistance to pro bono clients -- UPDATED

Back in May I reported (here) that a proposal was going to be brought up at the annual ABA meeting to amend Model Rule 1.8(e) which would allow lawyers to provide financial assistance to pro bono litigation clients.  

The meeting ended recently and it is now official that the ABA's House of Delegates adopted what is now probably going to be known as the "humanitarian" exception to MR 1.8(e).   The vote,  was 378 to 16. 

UPDATE: You can read (or download) a copy of the approved language here.

A list of (and links to) all the resolutions approved by the ABA at the annual meeting is available here.

Thanks to Karen Rubin for the links!


Monday, May 4, 2020

NY City Bar Association proposes humanitarian exception to rule that bans financial assistance to clients; ABA also considers similar proposal; do they go far enough?

Just over a week ago, the New York City Bar Association proposed an "urgent amendment" to Rule 1.8(e) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct to provide a “humanitarian exception” while the ABA is also considering a similar proposal.

As you may remember this is the rule that in most jurisdictions bans attorneys from providing financial assistance to clients involved in litigation. It is a rule that has been around forever, but as old as it is, it has also been criticized for not allowing much flexibility.  Some jurisdictions have adopted exceptions for deserving circumstances and in other jurisdictions courts have interpreted the rule to allow humanitarian help, even if the rule does not say that.

So, partly - probably mostly - in response to the health crisis brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic, the New York City Bar Association has made a formal proposal for an amendment to the rule.  You can read the full text of the proposal here.

As the proposal states, the proposed amendment would create a “humanitarian exception” to the current rule, which prohibits lawyers from providing financial assistance to litigation clients. 

This proposal was originally approved back in January 31, 2020 by the NY State Bar Association which then sent its recommendation to the Administrative Board of the Courts for consideration.  The NYCBA is merely now urging the Courts to act quickly to approve the humanitarian exception.

It should be noted that the request makes clear that the need for the humanitarian exception is not limited to the current pandemic.

. . . .Even before the current crisis, lawyers representing indigent clients pro bono have sought to provide financial assistance to clients in order to help them with basic necessities such as food, clothing, and access to healthcare.
      Under the current version of the ethics rules, a lawyer or law office could face disciplinary action for engaging in many of the activities described above.  But that should not be the case.  The humanitarian exception before the Courts is consistent with lawyers’ ethical and moral obligations to “seek improvement of the law; and to promote access to the legal system and the administration of justice.”  Especially now, lawyers should not be limited in their ability to provide assistance to clients who are struggling to make ends meet.
The proposal ends by suggesting that, as an alternative, if the Courts require more time to study the humanitarian exception and decide whether to fully amend Rule 1.8(e), the Courts should consider taking immediate short-term action, such as issuing a temporary order adopting the humanitarian exception until such a time as New York is no longer in a state of emergency that would expressly allow lawyers to provide financial assistance to indigent clients they are representing pro bono if the client has been financially impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

I understand the public policy behind rules that ban lawyers from providing financial assistance to clients but I agree that a humanitarian exception is a good idea.  In fact, I have argued that the rule should be amended rather than interpreted judicially to say something it does not say.  The proposal in NY takes the correct approach and it should be approved.

For comments on the issue go to The Law for Lawyers Today, Ethical Grounds, and Louisiana Legal Ethics.

Meanwhile, the ABA's Standing Committees on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and on Legal Aid and Indigent Defense have drafted a proposal to have the ABA House of Delegates approve a similar provision for the Model Rules.  The new exception would allow lawyers providing pro-bono services to provide financial assistance to clients under certain circumstances.  You can read the proposal here.

Note that neither proposal would allow a lawyer to provide financial assistance to a client if the legal services are being provided for a fee.  This means that a lawyer representing a client in financial need on a contingency fee would not be allowed to provide financial assistance.  If the client charged a contingency fee is in as much need as the one who is not charged a fee, why not allow the exception to apply?

Sunday, February 23, 2020

Illinois launches pilot pro bono program to help State Appellate Defenders Office

The Illinois Supreme Court has launched a pro bono pilot program to reduce the backlog of criminal appeals in the state. During the six-month pilot, which was announced on Feb. 11, volunteer pro bono attorneys will substitute as counsel for lawyers in the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) in certain criminal appeals.

Illinois Lawyer Now and 2 Civility have the story.

Wednesday, February 19, 2020

ABA adopts resolution urging states to reconsider certain aspects of the regulation of the profession after it is amended to eliminate reference to the possibility of non-lawyers participating as owners in law firms -- UPDATED

A few days ago I reported on the opposition to a proposal by the the ABA’s Center for Innovation and four standing committees seeking to promote the provision of legal services by non-lawyers and on the response by the proponents of the proposal.  Go here for that post and for links to the proposal and the letter explaining the position of those who opposed it.

I am writing today to report that two days ago, the ABA House of Delegates approved the resolution by a voice vote at the ABA Midyear Meeting after the resolution was amended to state that "nothing in this Resolution should be construed as altering any of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 5.4, as they relate to non-lawyer ownership of law firms, the unauthorized practice of law, or any other subject."  (The report that supported the resolution was also substantially revised, most notably to eliminate any reference to Rule 5.4 and to the delivery of legal services by anyone other than a lawyer.)

The main opposition to the proposal originates in the fact that although the resolution claims to be an attempt to deal with a real lack of accessibility to affordable legal services for many people in the U.S., there is no evidence that the only "innovations" the resolution seems to support would work to enhance access to services or that it would lead to lower their costs.   These types of initiatives might lead to the creation of multi-professional operations, in which accounting and financial firms will offer a "one shop experience" including legal services to clients who can afford services; but may not do much, if anything, to create more access to those who can't afford legal services.

Some have also expressed that the big proponents for “access to justice” are entities with interests in the tech fields who are interested in commoditizing legal work so the tech companies can make money at the expense of the lawyers.  This was one of the reasons why back in 2012, a Commission of the American Bar Association considered but later abandoned a proposal to allow non-lawyers to own shares in law firms.

Interestingly, California, Arizona, and Utah are currently considering changes to their versions of Model Rule 5.4 to perhaps allow non-lawyers to participate as owners in law firms.

Law Sites has a comment on the effect of the amendments to the proposal here (including the fact that the revision seems to suggest that certain legal needs should be met only by lawyers, and that the reference to Rule 5.4 can be seen as a roadblock to many of the innovations currently being considered in Utah, Arizona and California) and a comment on the proposal as a whole, here.

Faughnan On Ethics also has a comment here, which includes an update on the efforts in Utah, California and Arizona.

UPDATE 2/23/20:  2Civility has a comment here.

Sunday, February 16, 2020

ABA Amends Proposal on Access to Justice and Regulation of the Profession in Reaction to Opposition

Last week I reported on the opposition to a proposal by the the ABA’s Center for Innovation and four standing committees seeking to advance the discussion of proposals that would open the provision of legal services to non-lawyers. Go here for that post, which includes the text of a letter expressing opposition to the proposal.

Today I am writing again about this because Bloomberg Law is reporting that the resolution has been amended a second time "in order to gain support from state bar leaders aligned against the proposal." 

According to the report, the proposal was criticized as a "wink, a nod, and a green light” for the ABA to back the proposed reforms that would allow nonlawyers more latitude in co-owning legal operations which is opposed by lawyers concerned about preserving the independence of the legal profession, and in particular about protecting the profession from "side effects" of allowing the so-called "Big Four" accounting firms and other alternative legal service providers more regulatory latitude to compete directly with law firms. Bar rules currently disallow such companies from opening their own legal operations, or from joining forces with existing law firms.

Sunday, February 9, 2020

Debate on regulation of the profession intensifies as we near ABA mid-year meeting

Last November I reported that the ABA’s Center for Innovation and four standing committees adopted a resolution seeking to advance the discussion of proposals that would open the provision of legal services to non-lawyers and that the draft would be brought up for discussion at the ABA House of Delegates' meeting in February. You can download the resolution and the report here.

As I reported back then, the report is essentially based on the proposition that “traditional solutions” (such as increased funding for civil legal aid, more pro bono work, and the creation of the equivalent of a public defenders system for civil cases) have not come close to fixing the problem of lack of adequate access to affordable legal services and that the existing regulatory structure for the legal profession acts as a barrier to innovative alternatives like allowing involvement of other professionals, both within and outside of law firms.

Given this, the report suggests that states should concentrate efforts in three broad areas of regulatory reform: (1) authorizing and regulating new categories of legal services providers, including non-lawyers; (2) modifying the rules that ban lawyers from partnering and sharing fees with non-lawyers; and, (3) developing more permissive approaches to the notion of unauthorized practice of law to allow lawyers more freedom to practice across state borders.

These ideas have not gone unchallenged, though.  Just a few days ago, for example, I commented on a short column in which the author, although not opposing the resolution, argues there are other options to consider (see here).  And then there are those who actually do oppose the resolution, or at least some of its suggestions or premises.

In a published statement directed at the members of the ABA House of Delegates by individual members of the delegations from New York, New Jersey, Illinios, Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Nevada, for example, the authors argue as follows:
We ask you to join us in opposing Resolution 115.

Resolution 115 and its underlying report call for states to consider sweeping changes to fundamental principles of legal independence and ethics.  This proposal by the ABA’s “Center for Innovation” would allow non-lawyers to provide legal services and would encourage the repeal of professional conduct regulations that prohibit lawyers from partnering and sharing fees with those who are not lawyers.

On its face, Resolution 115 could appear to be a salutary effort to promote consideration of “regulatory innovations” that are aimed at improving access to justice.  However, the only such innovation covered by the report is the authorization of new forms of legal services providers to be achieved by revising Model Rule 5.4 (entitled “Professional Independence of a Lawyer”) and unauthorized practice laws in order to allow nonlawyers to practice law and to allow nonlawyer ownership of law firms.  The report is misleading as it fails to disclose that this House for at least three decades has opposed any such eradication of the prohibition on nonlawyer ownership of law firms because doing so would be inconsistent with our profession’s core values.  Moreover, nowhere does the report identify any evidence that the adoption of nonlawyer ownership in other jurisdictions has done anything to ameliorate access to justice concerns.

Back in 1999, this House roundly rejected a proposed multi-disciplinary practice regime under which lawyers would have been permitted to form business relations with nonlawyers or entities owned by nonlawyers for the purpose of practicing law.  The House chose to preserve the independence of our profession by opposing this change.

Again in 2011, the ABA’s Ethics 20/20 Commission released a discussion draft which sought comment on a limited form of nonlawyer ownership of law firms.  In response, the Illinois and New Jersey bars passed resolutions opposing this measure.  New York formed a Task Force that studied the nonlawyer ownership issue extensively and issued a comprehensive report on the subject. ... This detailed report is nowhere mentioned in the report that was submitted in support of Resolution 115.  Included in the Task Force report was a survey of New York lawyers who (across all walks of the profession) overwhelmingly opposed nonlawyer ownership.  While the New York Task Force’s work was ongoing, the ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission withdrew its nonlawyer ownership proposal, concluding that there was not a sufficient basis for recommending any change in the ABA’s policy against nonlawyer ownership.

Although the report in support of Resolution 115 cites a 2016 report by the ABA’s Commission on the Future of Legal Services, which supported gathering evidence on alternative law firm structures, that quotation is seriously misleading as it was never adopted by this House as ABA policy.  In fact (and not mentioned in the 115 Report), the Commission’s proposed resolution was expressly amended by this House, which resolved to add language to the resolution making clear that nothing in the resolution abrogated ABA policy against nonlawyer ownership of law firms or other core values of our profession.

Thus, this House’s steadfast opposition to nonlawyer ownership and its commitment to our profession’s core value of protecting the independence of lawyer judgments has been repeatedly recognized by this body, but is consistently ignored by the report.

The report gives the back of the hand to the principal concern that is raised by nonlawyer ownership – i.e., interference with lawyers’ independent professional judgments.  This approach is at odds with the resolution passed by this House in 2016 in response to the prior initiative proposed by the Commission on the Future of Legal Services.  As indicated above, that resolution specifically re-affirmed the need to protect this core value of our profession.  Nor does the report address what could happen if nonlawyers who control these sorts of alternative entities place their own business goals or personal interests ahead of the interests of clients.  Being a member of our noble profession is unique in that we often must put our clients’ interests ahead of our own.  Our highest priority ought to be advancing the profession’s duty to preserve uncompromised loyalty to our clients’ interests.  Outside ownership of legal providers would present a minefield for the profession by creating a dangerous tension between maintaining legal ethics and satisfying outside interests that are often motivated purely by profit.  A similar concern is raised by allowing nonlawyers who are not trained in legal ethics to provide legal services.  The report fails to grapple with this risk of eroding our profession’s critical values.

Noticeably absent from the report is any evidence that the embrace of nonlawyer ownership in the U.K. and Australia (or in the District of Columbia which has had a relaxed version of Rule 5.4 for many years) has had any impact whatsoever on the access to justice crisis.  Indeed, the typical alternative business structure in the U.K. competes with the same types of law firms that had been servicing the fee-paying public long before the U.K. recognized nonlawyer ownership, as opposed to providing services to the indigent.  Notably, a recent study concluded that the use of alternative business structures in the U.K. and Australia had been accompanied by no measurable improvement of those countries’ access to justice needs.  Robinson, Nick, When Lawyers Don't Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 1, 1 (2016).  We should expect some concrete proof that this proposed change would actually help address the country’s access to justice needs before encouraging something that could jeopardize lawyer independence.

The report states that there has been “no evidence of public harm” in the few countries that have adopted nonlawyer ownership.  But that  misses the point.  The burden is on the proponents of this fundamental change to demonstrate the benefit that their proposal would achieve, something they have failed to do.  Moreover, the report does not cite any study that has scrutinized the question of potential public harm comprehensively.  Nor does the report confront the critical issue of how disciplinary authorities can police persons and entities that do not even hold a law license and thus have no duty to abide by ethical codes.

The report puts the cart before the horse by encouraging states to consider embracing these alternative structures and only then to collect data on the impact that their adoption will have.  The report cites recent recommendations made in a few states to ease restrictions on nonlawyer ownership.  However, those recommendations only came out last year and no experience is yet available as to whether such contemplated changes will prove to be beneficial or harmful.

To be sure, we are not opposed to innovation and particularly in ways that can address our country’s access to justice crisis.  However, innovation should not come at the expense of our profession’s core values.

Our Rules of Professional Conduct reflect these core values of our profession and they are designed to protect the public whom we are all privileged and licensed to serve.  As attorneys, we are sworn to serve as key members of a legal system on whom our society relies for justice and fairness.  Lawyers must complete a rigorous program of education just to be permitted to sit for a bar examination.  Our bar admission system is designed to test knowledge and competency, determine character and fitness to practice law, and assess adherence to a prescribed set of rules of professional conduct throughout an attorney’s tenure.  This licensing system not only serves to protect the public from untrained and unscrupulous would-be practitioners, but also far surpasses what is required for a typical business.  Fundamental change to our profession should not compromise our core values and enable profit-seeking by entrepreneurs who are unencumbered by our rules of ethical responsibility.
Since then, members of the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (of which I am a member myself) have also had a chance to debate the resolution.  Some expressed skepticism about the resolution because it is not clear that there is evidence that the suggested reforms would actually increase access to justice for the disadvantaged or the middle class, while others seem to say that  until those opposing the types of reforms suggested in the resolution come up with a better alternative, we should be open to try something new.  And then there are those who don't seem to give the ABA a lot of credibility because, according to their position, regardless of the occasional lip service to this or that novel idea, the ABA has traditionally been a leading sponsor of the status quo.

Finally, there is the argument that the proposal is unfocused, or confusing, because while claiming to be about "access to justice," several items on the agenda do not seem to have much to do with access to justice.  Those making this argument ask, for example "how does allowing non-lawyers to become partners with lawyers translate into more access to legal services for the poor?"

On that last question, by the way, I can totally see how allowing non-lawyer investors may or may not have any effect whatsoever on the access to legal services because it all depends on how the firms use the newly acquired capital.  For that reason, the key question is how can new regulations be shaped so the changes do result in achieving the desired result.  That is what needs to be addressed.

For this reason, I am skeptical of some of the proposals, but I also agree with those who say that the effort to stifle all debate, study and discussion is not a good idea.

Monday, December 23, 2019

Puerto Rico Bar Association has filed an injunction petition in federal court to halt the implementation of new regulation that imposes mandatory pro bono and low paying mandatory appointment to represent clients in both civil and criminal cases

At some point in 2018, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court adopted a set of rules for the assignment of cases to court appointed attorneys (“Reglamento para la Asignación de Abogados y Abogadas de Oficio de Puerto Rico “) which is set to come into effect on January 1st, 2020.

According to this new system, some lawyers in private practice in Puerto Rico are obligated to be available to provide legal services to clients in both civil and criminal cases when appointed to do so.  The first 30 hours of service must be provided free of charge.  Thereafter, lawyers will be paid at the rate of $30.00 per hour for out of court work and $60.00 per hour for in court or appellate work.  These fees, however, are not to be recovered from a line item in the government’s budget and it is unclear as to whether the government will be able to generate the money to pay them.

In anticipation to the implementation of the new regulation, the Puerto Rico Bar Association (El Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Puerto Rico (CAAPR)) has filed a complaint and request for injunction in Federal District Court alleging that the regulation is unconstitutional.

Among other things, the complaint argues that the regulation exempts or excludes broad categories of attorneys from having to provide free legal services including lawyers in public service and those that provide ad honorem services for the judicial branch.

In addition, the complaint argues that forcing only some lawyers to provide legal services for free or for such low rates of compensation that are not enough to cover overhead expenses constitutes deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and a violation of the equal protection of the law.

You can read the complaint here

Saturday, November 30, 2019

ABA Center for Innovation drafts resolution and report encouraging U.S. jurisdictions to consider innovative approaches to the access to justice crisis

As we near the end of the year and start thinking of "top ten" lists, I think it is fair to say that the top three topics of debate in Professional Responsibility this year were (3) Model Rule 8.4(g), (2) the constitutionality of mandatory bar membership and (1) regulatory changes to allow non-lawyers to participate in the provision of legal services. 

The issue of regulatory changes is now back in the news because the ABA’s Center for Innovation and four standing committees recently published a report and a draft resolution seeking to advance the discussion of proposals that would open the provision of legal services to non-lawyers.  They will ask the ABA House of Delegates to vote on the resolution at the ABA's annual meeting in February.

You can download the resolution and the 11 page long report here

In a nutshell, the report is based on the proposition that “traditional solutions” (such as increased funding for civil legal aid, more pro bono work, and the creation of the equivalent of a public defenders system for civil cases) have resulted in some modest success, but they have not come close to fixing the problem of lack of adequate access to affordable legal services.

In addition, the report claims that the existing regulatory structure for the legal profession acts as a barrier to innovative alternatives like allowing involvement of other professionals, both within and outside of law firms.

For these reasons, the report encourages regulators and bar associations to follow the example of regulators in Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington all of whom are working on proposals to adopt substantial regulatory innovations designed to encourage new models for competent and cost-effective delivery of legal services.

Having said all that, however, the report concludes that it is not clear what type of innovation will be best and, thus, does not recommend any specific amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

Instead, the report (and the resolution based on it) call for U.S. jurisdictions to consider regulatory innovations that will develop new ways to deliver competent and cost-effective legal services.

More specifically, the report suggests that the efforts should concentrate in three broad areas of regulatory reform: (1) authorizing and regulating new categories of legal services providers, including non-lawyers; (2) modifying the rules that ban lawyers from partnering and sharing fees with non-lawyers; and, (3)  developing more permissive approaches to the notion of unauthorized practice of law to allow lawyers more freedom to practice across state borders.

Sunday, September 8, 2019

New California law imposes changes to the program that provides free legal services for poor in some civil cases, including custody matters and housing

Last week, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law a bill that imposes some changes to an existing law that provides free legal counsel to be appointed to low-income Californians for any level of legal or physical child custody matters, probate conservatorships and housing-related issues including eviction.

The new law requires the California Judicial Council to develop and provide grants, which could be donations from public or private entities, for programs in selected courts that provide legal counsel to the poor. Child custody cases would receive the highest priority for funding, regardless of whether one side is represented and the other is not.

You can read the bill here.

Tuesday, June 18, 2019

Attorney Compensation Survey

Martindale-Avvo has published its 2019 compensation survey available here.  I am not sure it has any surprises, but there are a few interesting graphs.  Among them, the one that caught my eye was the gender gap (page 6).  The comment that accompanies the graph states:  "A gender-compensation gap exists among solo practitioners and attorneys employed at small firms, with female attorneys reporting receiving 36% less income in 2018 than their male counterparts. Some of this disparity may be attributed to the number of years spent practicing law, with female attorneys reporting substantially fewer average years (16.3) in practice than their male counterparts (22.7). A higher proportion of female attorneys also represent consumers, where reported income in 2018 was less than that of attorneys primarily representing businesses."

Also, with all the talk about alternative billing in recent years, some might be surprised to learn that more than three-quarters of respondents use an hourly rate structure to bill clients.  Flat fees is the second most popular billing method (see page 12).

Sunday, June 9, 2019

Trump administration ends legal services for unaccompanied immigrant children

In apparent violation of a long-standing federal court settlement, the Trump administration government has stopped paying for legal services and English-language courses at jails for immigrant children around the country, saying budget cuts make it necessary. 

Courthouse News has more on the story here, as does Jurist (here) and Above the Law, which called the decision, the administration's latest act of pure villainy.

Tuesday, May 28, 2019

Another challenge to the notion of a "unified bar" -- this one in Oklahoma -- UPDATED

A few days ago I posted a story about a challenge to the constitutionality of the unified bar system in Texas.  See here.

Today's news is that a similar lawsuit has been filed in Oklahoma.

The lawsuit, in a case called Schell v. Williams, filed on March 26, alleges that Oklahoma's requirement that attorneys join the state bar association to practice in the state is unconstitutional because by forcing attorneys to join the Oklahoma Bar Association, the state violates their First Amendment rights to free speech and association

As I discussed in my previous posts on this, this is not a new argument but it is not a frivolous argument.  The question really goes to the core of whether such a requirement is necessary to regulate the legal profession or improve the quality of legal services.  As of right now, there are similar challenges pending in, at least, Texas and North Dakota and the results in these cases will have national implications.

UPDATE 4/5/19:   As I have said elsewhere, the question of whether mandatory membership in a bar association violates the First Amendment is not a new issue, so it is interesting that it is making such a strong comeback. In addition to the cases I reported recently, I was recently reminded by a reader of the blog that there are two separate lawsuits filed on similar grounds in Oregon as well as ongoing longstanding litigation against the Washington State Bar.

In Oregon, at least one of the lawsuits contends that the fact the state bar published a statement condemning White Nationalism and, what it called the "normalization of violence" was "blatantly political" and unconstitutional.

UPDATE 5/28/19:  Another lawsuit claiming requiring lawyers to be members of the state bar association violates the First Amendment has been filed.  The case is called Jarchow v State Bar of Wisconsin (Case No. 3:19-CV-00266) was filed, you guessed it, in Wisconsin on May 21. 

Sunday, May 19, 2019

Texas Attorney General sides with lawyers challenging mandatory bar membership

As you may remember I have been following the news about attacks in several states to the notion of a "unified bar."  See here and here, for example.  Lawsuits have been filed in Texas, Oklahoma, Oregon and North Dakota. 

In one way or another, all the lawsuits are claiming that the states' requirement that attorneys join the state bar association is an unconstitutional violation of attorneys' First Amendment rights to free speech and association.  More specifically, they argue that lawyers shouldn’t be forced to subsidize the state bar’s activities through mandatory membership dues if they don't agree with those activities for ideological or political reasons. 

For example, in the lawsuit in Texas, the plaintiffs are alleging they do not want to be forced to subsidize the state bar's diversity initiatives, access to justice programs and programs that help prevent deportations, and that promote legislative drafting and advocacy.

The most recent development on this topic is that Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton has filed an amicus brief that sides with the plaintiffs in the case in Texas.  He is the only AG to have taken this step so far in all the states where lawsuits have been filed.

Like I said in one of my previous posts, this is becoming the biggest topic in Professional Responsibility this year and the results of these lawsuits could have tremendous repercussions on how the profession continues to be regulated as well as on the viability of state programs that promote access to legal services.

Tuesday, March 26, 2019

Puerto Rico considers implementing IOLTA type rules; comments requested

As you probably know, IOLTA (short for "interest on lawyer trust accounts") programs are a mechanism for funding legal services for the poor. They require attorneys to place certain funds in interest generating accounts and banks to provide the interest to an agency that uses it to provide funds for legal services. All states and the District of Columbia have IOLTA programs. (About a decade ago, the program in DC became mandatory; see here).

Now comes news that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is considering adopting a similar program.  The text of it (in Spanish) is available here.  Comments should be sent to SecretariadoConferenciaJudicialyNotarial@ramajudicial.pr

If you want to learn more about the basics of IOLTA programs, you can listen to this short podcast.  Also, here is a short post on common mistakes lawyers make when handling an IOLTA account. If you want to read about the typical debate as to whether IOLTA programs are unconstitutional, you can take a look at this article, although that is only one of many, many others on the subject.


Monday, March 25, 2019

Texas lawsuit challenges mandatory membership in State Bar Association

Three Texas lawyers have filed a federal lawsuit claiming that mandatory membership in the State Bar of Texas violates their First Amendment right against coerced speech because the State Bar Association is using members’ mandatory dues, among other things, to fund programs that help undocumented immigrants seeking asylum, diversity initiatives and programs related to access to legal representation.  The case is called McDonald v. Longley and you can read the complaint here.

The question of the constitutionality of an integrated bar is not new.  In 1961, the US Supreme Court rejected a constitutional attack of mandatory membership in state bar associations in a case called Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 US 820 (1961). Also, in Cuyahoga Cty. Bar. Assn. v. Supeme Court of Ohio, 430 US 901 (1977), the Court summarily affirmed a lower court ruling on the constitutionality of a mandatory annual fee to support a state bar and disciplinary system. However, the free speech and free association arguments advanced in Lathrop were not rejected by the prevailing opinion. The Court simply found that more facts were needed for them to be considered. Other courts, however, have found that mandatory fees need to be related to bar organization matters.

Also, I discussed in some detail the back and forth history of the issue in Puerto Rico here.

The Texas Bar allows its members to opt out of supporting causes they do not believe in, but the plaintiffs in the lawsuit allege this system is inadequate.  At the very least, they argue, the system should be one in which the members would be required to "opt in" to avoid forcing them to fall into the default position of supporting causes they may or may not agree with.

Courthouse News and The ABA Journal have stories on the Texas lawsuit here and here.  According to the ABA Journal's story, the Texas lawsuit is among at least four current lawsuits that challenge mandatory state bar dues.

Monday, April 9, 2018

Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission announces it will begin to publish advisory opinions; and uses first opinion to find that participating in Avvo creates the risk of violating the rules

The Indiana Supreme Court announced today that it will begin offering ethical guidance to Indiana lawyers and judges via the Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Commission.  The opinions, which will be available online at the Indiana Courts Portal (here), will be non-binding and will be issued in response to prospective or hypothetical questions regarding the application of the ethics rules applicable to Indiana judges and lawyers. (By saying "prospective" there, the court means that it will not offer advice on past conduct.)

The commission made the announcement at the same time it release its first opinion which is on a topic I have written about extensively: whether participating in Avvo Legal Services (and other similar services) would constitute a violation of the rules of professional conduct. 

In the opinion, which is only three pages long, the Commission does not answer the question definitively, but concludes that participating in such programs raises the risk of violation of certain rules, including Rules 1.2(c), 5.4(a), 5.4(c), 7.2(b), 7.3(d) and 7.3(e).

The opinion essentially expresses the conclusions of the Commission rather than explain the analysis it used to reach those conclusions.  However, the conclusions are in accord with opinions published so far in other jurisdictions, all of which so far have reached essentially the same conclusions.  North Carolina is considering a proposed opinion that would conclude the opposite but it has not been adopted yet.  If adopted, it would be the first one to find that participating in Avvo Legal Services would not violate the rules, although it has been reported that North Carolina is also considering amending the rules, which suggests that it would violate the current rules. 

For all my posts on Avvo, go here, scroll down and then read up in chronological order... (ie, the most recent posts will appear at the top of the page.)