Update on Idaho's rejection of Model Rule 8.4(g)

Back in January I reported (here) that Idaho rejected a proposal to adopt Model Rule 8.4(g).  A few days ago, the Louisiana Legal Ethics Blog published a comment.

Idaho Supreme Court issues resolution explaining why it rejected Model Rule 8.4(g); hint: because it is unconstitutional...

In November 2021, the Idaho State Bar Commissioners recommended an amendment to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 to include anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provisions along the lines of those in Model Rule 8.4(g).  After the resolution was adopted by the members of the Bar, the proposal was sent to the Idaho Supreme Court but the Court declined to adopt the proposed amendment.  

Last week, the Court issued a resolution providing a full explanation of its rejection of the resolution explaining that it was “appropriate to explain our decision in some detail to explain our rationale for taking the action we are in order to provide guidance going forward in the event the Bar should seek to amend Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 in the future.”  

The Court then proceeded to explain that although it commends the Bar’s continued attempts to address unlawful discrimination and harassment in the legal profession it felt obliged to reject the proposed resolution because, among other things, the proposed amendment “violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to withstand strict scrutiny” and because it is void for vagueness and could have a chilling effect on speech.

You can find the court's resolution here or, through another link here.

I am not surprised by the opinion.  I, and many others, have been arguing that Model Rule 8.4(g)'s constitutionality is questionable for a long time.  You can read all my posts on the subject by going here and scrolling down.

Idaho Supreme Court abandons actual innocence requirement for legal malpractice actions against former criminal defense attorneys

Just about a year ago I reported (here) that the two most recent decisions on whether a convicted criminal defendant had to prove actual innocence in order to recover for malpractice against his or her former lawyer had broken away from the majority view on the issue.  A few months later, however, the Washington State Supreme Court reversed the trend by adhering to the majority view and holding that a criminal defendant must establish actual innocence to sue the defense attorney for malpractice.

Now comes news that last week the Idaho Supreme Court has abandoned the actual innocence rule in a case called Molen v. Christian.  In part, the court concluded:

We hold that actual innocence is not an element of a criminal malpractice cause of action. Requiring a criminal malpractice plaintiff to prove actual innocence is contrary to the fundamental principle that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, a criminal defendant can be harmed separately from the harm he or she incurs as a result of being guilty of a crime. . . .  Additionally, as a practical matter, requiring actual innocence would essentially eliminate a defense attorney’s duty to provide competent counsel to a client he or she knows to be guilty. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that actual innocence is not an element of a criminal malpractice cause of action.

This means that three of the last four jurisdictions to consider the issue have rejected the majority approach, which makes me wonder if what is the majority has now shifted.  I have not done a state by state survey recently, so I don't know for sure.  However, I have not read anyone make that claim yet, so I assume the majority approach is still to require a showing of actual innocence.  If someone has information about the actual count of how many states follow each approach, please let me know.