Tuesday, January 31, 2012
On the story about a lawyer who sued himself
A few days ago I posted a note about the old story about a lawyer who sued himself (here). The Australian Professional Liability blog picked up the story and added a few comments of its own here....
Attorney ads
The Criminal Justice Degrees blog has posted a selection of Top ten "weirdest and worst" lawyer ads. You can watch them all here.
Monday, January 30, 2012
Can a suspended attorney engage in advocacy if a non-lawyer can do it?
Can a suspended attorney engage in advocacy of a type which is permitted to nonlawyers? Last year, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania confronted the issue and decided the answer should be NO.
In that case, a suspended lawyer undertook employment representing claimants and employers before the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, a tribunal which allows nonlawyer representation. Disciplinary counsel brought a petition charging Bargeron with contempt, alleging that in representing clients he violated a rule which prohibits a suspended lawyer from law-related activities including “appearing on behalf of a client in any hearing or proceeding or before any judicial officer, arbitrator, mediator, court, public agency, referee, magistrate, hearing officer or any other adjudicative person or body.” In response, the lawyer cited Harkness v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 920 A.2d 162 (Pa. 2007), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a nonlawyer who represented claimants before the UCBR was not practicing law. Confronted with the issue, the Court determined the lawyer was in violation of the rule and ordered him to cease and desist from representing clients before the UCBR.
The case is called In the Matter of Bargeron and it is available here. More information here.
In that case, a suspended lawyer undertook employment representing claimants and employers before the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, a tribunal which allows nonlawyer representation. Disciplinary counsel brought a petition charging Bargeron with contempt, alleging that in representing clients he violated a rule which prohibits a suspended lawyer from law-related activities including “appearing on behalf of a client in any hearing or proceeding or before any judicial officer, arbitrator, mediator, court, public agency, referee, magistrate, hearing officer or any other adjudicative person or body.” In response, the lawyer cited Harkness v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 920 A.2d 162 (Pa. 2007), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a nonlawyer who represented claimants before the UCBR was not practicing law. Confronted with the issue, the Court determined the lawyer was in violation of the rule and ordered him to cease and desist from representing clients before the UCBR.
The case is called In the Matter of Bargeron and it is available here. More information here.
Sunday, January 29, 2012
A different type of prosecutorial misconduct
Typically, the more recent cases about prosecutorial misconduct we have discussed (and there have been many), have involved the duty to disclose information to the defense or issues related to improper arguments. Here is a link to a new case from the Indiana Supreme Court that involves a different type of misconduct. If I had to classify it, I'd place it under the notion of "scope of representation and allocation of authority between client and lawyer," which is the title of Model Rule 1.2.
The case is called In the Matter of Flatt-Moore and it involved a prosecutor who "surrender[ed] her prosecutorial discretion in plea negotiations entirely to the pecuniary demands of the victim of the crime." In other words, she allowed the victim of the crime to dictate the terms of the plea agreement. The court found that this conduct involved a prohibited conflict of interest and was prejudicial to the administration of justice. The key to the case, though, was the fact that the terms of the plea were based on restitution of an amount that was higher than the amount of injury actually caused by the defendant. The victim was trying to use the criminal process to obtain advantage in its civil claims against the defendant. The prosecutor either did not realize this or knowingly tried to help the victim.
The court noted that although a victim is permitted to have significant input in the plea bargaining process, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by ceding to the victim absolute control of the negotiations concerning the plea.
Thanks to the Legal Profession blog for the information.
The case is called In the Matter of Flatt-Moore and it involved a prosecutor who "surrender[ed] her prosecutorial discretion in plea negotiations entirely to the pecuniary demands of the victim of the crime." In other words, she allowed the victim of the crime to dictate the terms of the plea agreement. The court found that this conduct involved a prohibited conflict of interest and was prejudicial to the administration of justice. The key to the case, though, was the fact that the terms of the plea were based on restitution of an amount that was higher than the amount of injury actually caused by the defendant. The victim was trying to use the criminal process to obtain advantage in its civil claims against the defendant. The prosecutor either did not realize this or knowingly tried to help the victim.
The court noted that although a victim is permitted to have significant input in the plea bargaining process, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by ceding to the victim absolute control of the negotiations concerning the plea.
Thanks to the Legal Profession blog for the information.
Budget cuts and layoffs in legal assistance
Last November the federal government enacted a bill that slashed federal funding for civil legal assistance to the poor by about 14% — from $404.2 million to $348 million, which is the lowest level since 2007. For this reason, civil legal aid groups that receive money from the Legal Services Corp. have estimated that they will cut 163 lawyers and 230 other employees this year. This is bad news at a time when it is universally agreed that the vast majority of the legal needs of the poor are not met and that most people do not have access to legal representation. For more on this story go to to the Blog of the Legal Times and the Wall Street Journal law blog.
Attorney sued himself
Lowering the Bar has a short comment (here) on a very old story involving a lawyer who sued himself on behalf of a client. The story is based on this clip which appeared in the New York Times in August of 1936 (I told you it was an old story)...
Wednesday, January 25, 2012
NY Bar Ass'n Committee on Ethics approves use of "Groupon"
Because ABA Model Rule 5.4 prevents a lawyer from sharing fees with non-lawyers in most cases, there has been some discussion on whether lawyers can try to attract clients by sharing a percentage of the fee with the service that provides the means for the lawyers to communicate with the possible clients.... or in short: can lawyers advertise and attract clients by participating in "Groupon"?
Back in September I wrote about ethical opinions in North and South Carolina on the issue (here).
The question is now back in the news because the New York Bar Association's Committee on Ethics has issued a new opinion that concludes that "a lawyer may properly market legal services on a “deal of the day” or “group coupon”website, provided that the advertisement is not false, deceptive or misleading, and that the advertisement clearly discloses that a lawyer-client relationship will not be created until after the lawyer has checked for conflicts and determined whether the lawyer is competent to perform a service appropriate to the client."
You can read the opinion here.
Thanks to the Wall Street Journal law blog for the information.
Back in September I wrote about ethical opinions in North and South Carolina on the issue (here).
The question is now back in the news because the New York Bar Association's Committee on Ethics has issued a new opinion that concludes that "a lawyer may properly market legal services on a “deal of the day” or “group coupon”website, provided that the advertisement is not false, deceptive or misleading, and that the advertisement clearly discloses that a lawyer-client relationship will not be created until after the lawyer has checked for conflicts and determined whether the lawyer is competent to perform a service appropriate to the client."
You can read the opinion here.
Thanks to the Wall Street Journal law blog for the information.
Lawyer faces criminal charges after showing up drunk to court
I have written before on cases involving attorneys showing up drunk to court (see here, here and here, for example). Today the ABA Journal is reporting on a new case in which "a California lawyer has been criminally charged after allegedly appearing at court to represent clients at hearings in a drunken state." According to the Visalia Times, the lawyer had twice the legal limit of alcohol in her system when she was given a breath-alcohol test as she entered the courthouse. For more on this case go here, here and here.
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Is creating a website a form of solicitation or just advertising?
Assume there is a big accident involving hundreds of victims and a lawyer sets up a website specifically targeted to victims to lure them into hiring the lawyer to file claims on their behalf. The lawyer is not sending out e-mails, spam, letters or visiting anyone in person. He just creates a website and waits for people to find it. Then assume that the jurisdiction where this happens has a 30 day "waiting period" type rule and the website was operating in less than 30 days after the accident. Has the attorney violated the waiting period rule by creating the website?
Obviously, at least in part, the answer depends on the actual language of the rule. Suppose the rule says it is a violation of the rule to "contact" a victim. Is setting up a website a way to "contact" victims.
This question is the subject of debate now in New York, where an attorney created a website in an attempt to sign up people who were stuck in the subway during the recent blizzard. The Daily News has more on the story.
New York blogger Eric Turkewitz has published a good comment in which he concludes that setting up the website violates New York’s 30-day anti-solicitation rule which states, in relevant part, that "No solicitation relating to a specific incident involving potential claims for personal injury . . . shall be disseminated before the 30th day after the date of the incident . . ."
There is no question in my mind that the website is targeted to a specific audience, but it is not so clear whether setting up a website is a form or "disseminating" solicitation materials.
A website is not something that is sent to the victims (like the letter in Shapero) or something that people receive when they don't expect it (like the newspaper page in Zauderer or a billboard that you did not expect to see when driving). The website is out there, somewhere in cyberspace where people have to actually look for it.
Obviously, if the lawyer is publicizing the website by other means - like letters or ads, etc. - the issue is easier to deal with, but assuming the lawyer simply created the website and let it sit there and people find it when they try to search for news on the blizzard or something like that, I am not so sure the question is as clear cut.
Having said that, as Eric Turkewitz explains, in New York, however, the question appears to be covered by Rule 7.3(c)(5) which states that a website maintained by the lawyer or law firm is not a form of solicitation unless the web site is designed for and directed to or targeted at a prospective client affected by an identifiable actual event or occurrence or by an identifiable prospective defendant.
UPDATE: Thanks to Eric Turkewitz again for the original story and for this update: the website in question has been turned off.
UPDATE (2/24/2012): Last September, the ABA's 20/20 Commission circulated a proposal which, among many other things, proposed to add a paragraph to the comment to Model Rule 7.3 which says, in part, that "a lawyer’s communication typically does not constitute a solicitation if it is directed to the general public, such as through a billboard, an Internet banner advertisement, a website or a television commercial, or if it is in response to a request for information or is automatically generated in response to Internet searches."
In the example we are discussing here, the website did not seem to be directed to the general public, but it would "only be found in response to a request for information", etc. So is it an ad or is it solicitation?
UPDATE (August 2012): The proposed amendment was adopted by the ABA and now appears as the first paragraph of the comment to Model Rule 7.3. For more on the amendments to the rules adopted in August 2012 go here, here and here.
Obviously, at least in part, the answer depends on the actual language of the rule. Suppose the rule says it is a violation of the rule to "contact" a victim. Is setting up a website a way to "contact" victims.
This question is the subject of debate now in New York, where an attorney created a website in an attempt to sign up people who were stuck in the subway during the recent blizzard. The Daily News has more on the story.
New York blogger Eric Turkewitz has published a good comment in which he concludes that setting up the website violates New York’s 30-day anti-solicitation rule which states, in relevant part, that "No solicitation relating to a specific incident involving potential claims for personal injury . . . shall be disseminated before the 30th day after the date of the incident . . ."
There is no question in my mind that the website is targeted to a specific audience, but it is not so clear whether setting up a website is a form or "disseminating" solicitation materials.
A website is not something that is sent to the victims (like the letter in Shapero) or something that people receive when they don't expect it (like the newspaper page in Zauderer or a billboard that you did not expect to see when driving). The website is out there, somewhere in cyberspace where people have to actually look for it.
Obviously, if the lawyer is publicizing the website by other means - like letters or ads, etc. - the issue is easier to deal with, but assuming the lawyer simply created the website and let it sit there and people find it when they try to search for news on the blizzard or something like that, I am not so sure the question is as clear cut.
Having said that, as Eric Turkewitz explains, in New York, however, the question appears to be covered by Rule 7.3(c)(5) which states that a website maintained by the lawyer or law firm is not a form of solicitation unless the web site is designed for and directed to or targeted at a prospective client affected by an identifiable actual event or occurrence or by an identifiable prospective defendant.
UPDATE: Thanks to Eric Turkewitz again for the original story and for this update: the website in question has been turned off.
UPDATE (2/24/2012): Last September, the ABA's 20/20 Commission circulated a proposal which, among many other things, proposed to add a paragraph to the comment to Model Rule 7.3 which says, in part, that "a lawyer’s communication typically does not constitute a solicitation if it is directed to the general public, such as through a billboard, an Internet banner advertisement, a website or a television commercial, or if it is in response to a request for information or is automatically generated in response to Internet searches."
In the example we are discussing here, the website did not seem to be directed to the general public, but it would "only be found in response to a request for information", etc. So is it an ad or is it solicitation?
UPDATE (August 2012): The proposed amendment was adopted by the ABA and now appears as the first paragraph of the comment to Model Rule 7.3. For more on the amendments to the rules adopted in August 2012 go here, here and here.
Another case that illustrates inconsistency in sanctions
The Legal Profession blog is reporting today on a case from Pennsylvania where an attorney was suspended for four years because he was found guilty in a money laundering case. He was convicted as a result of an FBI undercover sting operation of bribes and kickbacks from unqualified loan applicants. The FBI agent approached the bank president with an idea to conceal his ownership in property because of a bitter divorce. The lawyer was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 30 months in prison.
So here we have what appears to be a felony conviction (I am not sure the court used the term felony, but given the length of the sentence it seems fair to call it that), for a crime of dishonesty and intent and yet the court does not impose disbarment. I don't get it.
The case is called Office of Disciplinary Counsel v Sinko and it is available here.
So here we have what appears to be a felony conviction (I am not sure the court used the term felony, but given the length of the sentence it seems fair to call it that), for a crime of dishonesty and intent and yet the court does not impose disbarment. I don't get it.
The case is called Office of Disciplinary Counsel v Sinko and it is available here.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)