Monday, March 28, 2011

Proper punishment or abuse of discretion?

At the end of 2009, I posted a comment on the issue of whether humiliation is a proper punishment in our criminal justice system or whether it should be considered an abuse of prosecutorial or judicial discretion. A few days later I posted an editorial on the subject by Prof. Jonathan Turley published by USA Today (here)

Now comes news that a judge and prosecutor have demanded that Willy Nelson sing a song in court as part of a plea agreement in a simple marijuana possession case. Prof. Turley, consistent with his position in the article cited above, wrote today "I hate to be a cold blanket, but find this neither funny nor tolerable for a legal system. Both the judge and the prosecutor appear to be intoxicated by celebrity crime. . . . If these facts are correct as widely reported, there should be an investigation by the bar of both the role of the prosecutor and the court. Dean-Walker can still redeem herself by treating Nelson like other defendants and sanctioning the prosecutor if he did in fact demand this condition for a settlement." You can read his comment here.

Can an attorney respond if the judge asks whether the attorney knows why the client is missing?

Suppose that night before a hearing is supposed to start, the mother of a criminal defense attorney tells the attorney that her son (the client) is not going to show up. Then, when the judge notices the defendant is missing, the judge asks the lawyer where the client is or whether the lawyer knows why the client is not there. What should he lawyer do?

A short ethics opinion by the San Diego County Bar Association concludes that, under the California Rules of Professional Conduct, the attorney can't do anything. The attorney simply can't answer the judge’s question. If the attorney says she does not know, she is being dishonest with the court in violation of her duty of candor, and if she discloses the information provided by the mother, the attorney would be in violation of her duty of confidentiality.

Thus, the only proper response by the attorney would be that she can't answer the question. The Opinion (SDCBA Legal Ethics Opinion 2011-1) is available here.

Thanks to the Legal Profession blog for the link.

Colorado DA implements a plan that creates incentives for DAs to violate their duties

Should prosecutors receive bonuses if they score relatively high conviction rates? The Wall Street Journal Law Blog is reporting (here) that according to a plan devised by Colorado district attorney Carol Chambers assistant district attorneys are eligible to earn an average $1,100 reward if they participate in at least 5 trials during the year and get felony convictions in at least 70% of their trials. Plea bargains don’t count.

Am I missing something or is this institutionalizing a systems that by definition creates a conflict of interest between the (personal/financial) interests of the DA and the duties under rule 3.8 that require prosecutors to act as ministers of justice and not just as advocates?

According to the story, Chambers told the newspaper that her bonus system is similar to incentive plans used by private employers. The problem is that prosecutors are not like lawyers in private practice. The rules of professional conduct impose on them different duties, particularly a duty to act in the best interest of justice. This means that the prosecutor has to make sure that justice is served, not just that people are convicted to keep the numbers up.

Everyone knows that most convictions in this country are achieved via plea bargains, but, the bonus system in Colorado encourages prosecutors to pursue trials in lieu of plea bargains to qualify for a bonus. Thus, the bonus system actually could encourage prosecutors to act against their duty as a minister of justice.

Sunday, March 27, 2011

Discipline for lawyer who claimed she could "channel" the client's dead wife's spirit

A few months ago, I reported (here, here and here) on a case out of Arizona where a lawyer tried to convince her client that the client's dead wife's spirit had "come to her" and that she could communicate the wife's thoughts. Among other thoughts, the lawyer claimed the deceased wife wanted the client to have sex with the lawyer. The lawyer continued to "channel" the wife's thoughts to the client for three years.

The State Bar brought disciplinary charges against the attorney seeking disbarment but the Arizona Disciplinary Commission imposed only a one year suspension on the attorney. The State Bar then asked the Supreme Court to review the case and disbar the lawyer. The Legal Profession blog is reporting now that the Court sided with the Commission and imposed only a one year suspension.

The opinion is available here. The report of the Disciplinary Commission is attached here.

Thanks to the Legal Profession blog for the links.

What do you have to do to get disbarred in New Jersey?!

The Legal Profession blog has a short report on a recent case in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided not to disbar an attorney even though the attorney had already faced eight ethics complaints in the past, half of which had resulted in suspensions. To make it worse, it appears that the attorney did not even care to respond to the charges in four of those cases. To its credit, the Disciplinary Review Board had recommeded disbarment. I understand the value in providing second chances but after 4 suspensions and a recommendation by the Board to disbar... C'mon!

Friday, March 25, 2011

Follow up on Supreme Court oral argument in Turner v Rogers

In Turner v Rogers, the Supreme Court is considering whether there is a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings that can result in incarceration. The ScotUS blog has all the relevant documents and briefs. The transcript of the oral argument is available here.

Amanda Rice of the ScotUS blog reports that after the oral argument, Jesse Holland of the Associated Press reported that “the Court sounded reluctant to extend the right to a taxpayer-provided lawyer . . . to civil proceedings where a person faces jail time.” Similarly, Adam Liptak of the New York Times described the Justices as “appear[ing] frustrated” during the argument, as “[i]t seemed that there were procedural and practical problems with almost every potential ruling.”

Prof. Renee Newman Knake, of the Legal Ethics Forum, adds that Adam Liptak summarizes the argument in Justices Grapple With Issue of Right to Lawyers in Child Support Cases. The ABA filed an amicus brief saying yes, "that poor people should have the right to a lawyer in civil contempt proceedings carrying a threat of jail time." Professors Ben Barton and Darryl Brown filed an amicus brief arguing no, that pro se reforms are the better alternative for ensuring justice in these types of cases.

For more comments on the case, go here and here.

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Supreme Court to hear argument in case on right to attorney in civil contempt proceeding

Tomorrow the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Turner v. Rogers (formerly titled Turner v. Price) which asks whether an indigent client has a right to an attorney for civil contempt proceeding that could lead to jail time. Stay tuned for updates on the transcript and more.

Monday, March 21, 2011

Supreme Court reverses finding that prosecutor selected jury improperly

In a very short Per curiam opinion (available here), the United States Supreme Court has issued reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's finding that a trial prosecutor had struck two members of the jury venire for race-based reasons. The defendant's motion for relief based on the prosecutor's conduct had been denied by the trial court and affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. After that court affirmed, the defendant sought habeas relief in federal court, but the District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then reversed finding that "[t]he prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral bases for peremptorily striking the two African-American jurors were not sufficient to counter the evidence of purposeful discrimination in light of the fact that two out of three prospective African-American jurors were stricken, and the record reflected different treatment of comparably situated jurors."

The US Supreme Court, however, found this conclusion to be "as inexplicable as it is unexplained" and reversed. The case is Felkner v. Jackson and it is available here.

Thanks to the Legal Profession blog for the update.

Supreme Court grants cert in yet another prosecutorial misconduct case

The Supreme Court just announced it has granted review in a case called Rehberg v. Paulk which asks "whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” by presenting perjured testimony against an innocent citizen is entitled to absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim for civil damages." The lower court's opinion is available here. As usual, the Supreme Court blog has all the information and links here, including the Petition for certiorari, and all the briefs and replies. Make sure you keep that link handy, since they keep updating it with documents as they are filed.

I have not had a chance to read the opinion or the petition for cert so I do not know the details but I have been speculating for a while that after all the prosecutorial misconduct scandals in 2009 (go here and scroll down for all my posts on prosecutorial misconduct), the Court has been looking for opportunities to express itself on the subject. It first granted review in the Pottawatomie case which eventually settled, and then Connick v Thompson, for which it heard oral arguments in the fall.

Rehberg is, therefore, the third case related to the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in two terms. For previous posts on Pottawatomie go here, here and here. For previous posts on Connick v Thompson, including links to the oral arguments, go here, here, here, here and here.

Thursday, March 17, 2011

Does using the plural "offices" when you only have one location violate the rules?

We have seen a number of cases where courts have found the use of "associates" in a firm's name deceptive if there is only one associate or if the attorney does not have any associates at all. A couple of days ago, I noticed a couple of attorneys refer to their firms as "The Law Offices of ....(so and so)..." I wonder if the word "offices" suggests there are multiple locations. Assuming there is only one, does the title of the firm violate the rules?